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Date: Sat, 11 Aug 2012 23:34:20 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <matthew@....cx>, Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>, Joe Korty <joe.korty@...r.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: add link restrictions
On Wed, Aug 8, 2012 at 5:19 AM, Vasily Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote:
> Hi Kees,
>
> On Wed, Jul 25, 2012 at 17:29 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> +/**
>> + * safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions
>> + * @inode: the source inode to hardlink from
>> + *
>> + * Return false if at least one of the following conditions:
>> + * - inode is not a regular file
>> + * - inode is setuid
>> + * - inode is setgid and group-exec
>> + * - access failure for read and write
>> + *
>> + * Otherwise returns true.
>> + */
>> +static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
>> +{
>> + umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
>> +
>> + /* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
>> + if (!S_ISREG(mode))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + /* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
>> + if (mode & S_ISUID)
>> + return false;
>
> We don't want to make hardlinks of SUID files, but we still allow to create
> hardlinks to SUID'ish cap'ed files. Probably check whether the inode is
> setcap'ed?
Excellent idea. It doesn't look like there is anything "simple" to do
this already. It'd be close to get_file_caps() but without the bprm.
Maybe just get_vfs_caps_from_disk() and a walk of the caps? What would
you recommend?
> Probably we can enhance this further and allow LSMs to define whether this
> particular file is special in LSM's point of view (IOW, it can be able to move
> a process to another security domain which is served by LSM).
Yeah. Perhaps implementing the needed check above with a new security
check and have commoncaps do the vfs fetch with LSMs able to override?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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