Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 17:55:02 -0700 From: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu> To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mcgrathr@...gle.com, indan@....nu, netdev@...isplace.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...otime.net, tglx@...utronix.de, serge.hallyn@...onical.com, pmoore@...hat.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, corbet@....net, markus@...omium.org, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@...omium.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 5:38 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote: > On 05/24/2012 05:26 PM, Andrew Lutomirski wrote: >> >> Just to clarify: are you suggesting that, for now, the traced behavior >> should be: >> >> process -> seccomp -> ptrace -> kernel? >> >> If so, I think the man page or something should have a big fat warning >> that seccomp filters should *never* allow ptrace (even PTRACE_TRACEME) >> unless they fully understand the issue. >> > > Yes, and yes. > >> In any case, I think that the UML interaction is missing the point. >> UML will *emulate* the seccomp filter. If it chooses to use host >> seccomp filters for some business, that's its business. > > I don't see why UML should have to emulate the seccomp filter. With the > proposed order, then it can simply use the seccomp filter provided by > the host. Furthermore, with this sequencing UML can actually *use* > seccomp to provide the simulation. Hmm. I guess I agree. I'll shut up now :) --Andy
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