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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.02.1205250932270.26644@tundra.namei.org>
Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 09:40:18 +1000 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mcgrathr@...gle.com, hpa@...or.com,
indan@....nu, netdev@...isplace.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com,
peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...otime.net, tglx@...utronix.de,
luto@....edu, serge.hallyn@...onical.com, pmoore@...hat.com,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, corbet@....net, markus@...omium.org,
coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@...omium.org,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call
On Thu, 24 May 2012, Will Drewry wrote:
> As is, the biggest benefit of this change is just setting consistent
> expectations in what the ptrace/seccomp interactions should be. The
> current ability for ptrace to "bypass" secure computing (by remapping
> allowed system calls) is not necessarily a problem, but it is not
> necessarily intuitive behavior.
Indeed -- while the purpose of seccomp is to reduce the attack surface of
the syscall interface, if a user allows ptrace, attackers will definitely
see that as an attack vector, if it allows them to increase that attack
surface.
It at least needs to be well-documented.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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