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Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2012 13:47:12 -0700
From: Markus Gutschke <markus@...omium.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, arnd@...db.de, davem@...emloft.net,
hpa@...or.com, mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org,
rdunlap@...otime.net, mcgrathr@...omium.org, tglx@...utronix.de, luto@....edu,
eparis@...hat.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com, djm@...drot.org,
scarybeasts@...il.com, indan@....nu, pmoore@...hat.com, corbet@....net,
eric.dumazet@...il.com, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@...omium.org,
jmorris@...ei.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve
from granting privs
On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 12:49, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500
> Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> wrote:
>> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
>> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
>> subverting privileged binaries.
I don't want to derail things. So, tell me to go away, if I can't have
what I want.
Having said that, it would be great if NO_NEW_PRIVS also gave access
to the restricted clone() flags. Such as CLONE_NEWIPC, CLONE_NEWNET
and CLONE_NEWPID.
Markus
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