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Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2012 08:36:35 +0100
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Federica Teodori <federica.teodori@...glemail.com>,
Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@...il.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...otime.net>,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2012.1] fs: symlink restrictions on sticky directories
* Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 5, 2012 at 1:17 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> wrote:
> > * Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> >
> >> @@ -1495,6 +1496,15 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
> >> #endif
> >> #endif
> >> {
> >> + .procname = "protected_sticky_symlinks",
> >> + .data = &protected_sticky_symlinks,
> >> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> >> + .mode = 0644,
> >> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> >> + .extra1 = &zero,
> >> + .extra2 = &one,
> >> + },
> >
> > Small detail:
> >
> > Might make sense to change the .mode to 0600, to make it
> > harder for unprivileged attack code to guess whether this
> > protection (and the resulting audit warning to the
> > administrator) is enabled on a system or not.
>
> Sure, I have no problem with that. In addition to this change,
> what's the best next step for this patch?
Al and Linus's call I guess. Maybe ask Andrew whether he'd put
it into -mm?
Thanks,
Ingo
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