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Date: Thu, 5 Jan 2012 11:36:11 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Federica Teodori <federica.teodori@...glemail.com>,
Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@...il.com>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...otime.net>,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2012.1] fs: symlink restrictions on sticky directories
On Thu, Jan 5, 2012 at 1:17 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> wrote:
> * Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
>> @@ -1495,6 +1496,15 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
>> #endif
>> #endif
>> {
>> + .procname = "protected_sticky_symlinks",
>> + .data = &protected_sticky_symlinks,
>> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
>> + .mode = 0644,
>> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
>> + .extra1 = &zero,
>> + .extra2 = &one,
>> + },
>
> Small detail:
>
> Might make sense to change the .mode to 0600, to make it harder
> for unprivileged attack code to guess whether this protection
> (and the resulting audit warning to the administrator) is
> enabled on a system or not.
Sure, I have no problem with that. In addition to this change, what's
the best next step for this patch?
Thanks,
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security
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