Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 22:20:16 +0300 From: Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi> To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>, Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>, Jesper Juhl <jj@...osbits.net>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 9:55 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote: > Oh, we also have perf... Given these are separate interfaces, I think > slab oriented restriction makes more sense. > > So, now we have: > > /proc/slabinfo > /sys/kernel/slab > /proc/meminfo > 'perf kmem' - not sure what specific files should be guarded I don't think you can close down 'perf kmem' per se. You need to make sure the attacker is not able to use perf tracing (of which 'perf kmem' is a subset). Pekka
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