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Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 12:51:10 -0500 (CDT)
From: Christoph Lameter <>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <>
cc: Pekka Enberg <>,
  Andrew Morton <>,, Kees Cook <>,
  Cyrill Gorcunov <>, Al Viro <>,
  Christoph Lameter <>, Matt Mackall <>,,,
  Dan Rosenberg <>, Theodore Tso <>,
  Alan Cox <>, Jesper Juhl <>,
  Linus Torvalds <>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to

On Mon, 19 Sep 2011, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:

> > > kmalloc() is still visible in slabinfo as kmalloc-128 or so.
> >
> > Yes, but there's no way for users to know where the allocations came from
> > if you mix them up with other kmalloc-128 call-sites. That way the number
> > of private files will stay private to the user, no? Doesn't that give you even
> > better protection against the infoleak?
> No, what it gives us is an obscurity, not a protection.  I'm sure it
> highly depends on the specific situation whether an attacker is able to
> identify whether the call is from e.g. ecryptfs or from VFS.  Also the
> correlation between the number in slabinfo and the real private actions
> still exists.

IMHO a restriction of access to slab statistics is reasonable in a
hardened environment. Make it dependent on CONFIG_SECURITY or some such

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