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Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:31:42 +0300
From: Pekka Enberg <>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <>
Cc: Andrew Morton <>,, 
	Kees Cook <>, Cyrill Gorcunov <>, Al Viro <>, 
	Christoph Lameter <>, Matt Mackall <>,,, Dan Rosenberg <>, Theodore Tso <>, 
	Alan Cox <>, Jesper Juhl <>, 
	Linus Torvalds <>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo

On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 7:18 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <> wrote:
>> However, if the encryptfs and infoleaks really are serious enough to
>> hide /proc/slabinfo, I think you should consider switching over to
>> kmalloc() instead of kmem_cache_alloc() to make sure nobody can
>> gain access to the information.
> kmalloc() is still visible in slabinfo as kmalloc-128 or so.

Yes, but there's no way for users to know where the allocations came from
if you mix them up with other kmalloc-128 call-sites. That way the number
of private files will stay private to the user, no? Doesn't that give you even
better protection against the infoleak?


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