Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:31:42 +0300 From: Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi> To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>, Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>, Jesper Juhl <jj@...osbits.net>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 7:18 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote: >> However, if the encryptfs and infoleaks really are serious enough to >> hide /proc/slabinfo, I think you should consider switching over to >> kmalloc() instead of kmem_cache_alloc() to make sure nobody can >> gain access to the information. > > kmalloc() is still visible in slabinfo as kmalloc-128 or so. Yes, but there's no way for users to know where the allocations came from if you mix them up with other kmalloc-128 call-sites. That way the number of private files will stay private to the user, no? Doesn't that give you even better protection against the infoleak? Pekka
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