Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2011 10:28:55 +0400 From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> To: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 19:06 +0400, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote: > On Sat, Sep 10, 2011 at 08:41:34PM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote: > > Historically /proc/slabinfo has 0444 permissions and is accessible to > > the world. slabinfo contains rather private information related both to > > the kernel and userspace tasks. Depending on the situation, it might > > reveal either private information per se or information useful to make > > another targeted attack. Some examples of what can be learned by > > reading/watching for /proc/slabinfo entries: > > > ... > > Since this file is controversy point, probably its permissions might be > configurable via setup option? We could create DEBUG_PROC (of cource, defaults to =n) to keep current relaxed procfs permissions, but I don't think a configure option is needed for a thing which is trivially done via "chmod" in init scripts. -- Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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