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Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2011 21:06:01 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 2/5 v4] procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount options
(cc'ed Eric)
On Mon, Jun 20, 2011 at 20:43 +1000, James Morris wrote:
> > > > hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but their
> > > > own. Sensitive files like cmdline, io, sched*, status, wchan are now
> > > > protected against other users. As permission checking done in
> > > > proc_pid_permission() and files' permissions are left untouched,
> > > > programs expecting specific files' permissions are not confused.
> > >
> > > IMHO such programs are beyond broken and have voided their kernel
> > > warranty.
> >
> > Policykit, Debian's start-stop-daemon, util-linux use /proc/PID's uid.
> > procps use both /proc/PID's uid and gid. Are all of them totally broken?
>
> If they depend on specific permissions, yes.
Could you please then clarify why does this patch changes
pid_revalidate() behaviour:
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff;h=99f895518368252ba862cc15ce4eb98ebbe1bec6
It changes files permissions to allow userspace apps to quickly stat
files, not looking into /proc/PID/status. So, uid and gid are explicit
ABI. Breaking procfs uid/gid attributes would break these apps.
Or am I missing something?
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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