Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2011 15:07:48 +1000 (EST) From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC 2/5 v4] procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount options [please cc: the lsm list with this kind of thing] > This patch adds support of mount options to restrict access to > /proc/PID/ directories. The default backward-compatible 'relaxed' > behaviour is left untouched. Can you provide evidence that this is a useful feature? e.g. examples of exploits / techniques which would be _usefully_ hampered or blocked. > The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much > info about processes we want to be available for non-owners: > > hidepid=0 (default) means the current behaviour - anybody may read all > world-readable /proc/PID/* files. Why not utilize unix perms on the proc files? Perhaps via stricter overall defaults which are selected at kernel build or runtime. > hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but their > own. Sensitive files like cmdline, io, sched*, status, wchan are now > protected against other users. As permission checking done in > proc_pid_permission() and files' permissions are left untouched, > programs expecting specific files' permissions are not confused. IMHO such programs are beyond broken and have voided their kernel warranty. -- James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.