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Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2011 14:42:07 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <>
Subject: proc info restrictions problem


I'm trying to adapt HARDEN_PROC restrictions to taskstats and proc
connector and stuck with a problem.  proc connector is a special
broadcast netlink socket that gathers all proc information (fork, exit,
exec).  There is one mechanism to filter the data coming into actual
receiving sockets:

int netlink_broadcast_filtered(..., void (*filter)(sock, skb, data), data)

"sock" is receiving socket, filter answers whether the skb should be
send to "sock".

The thing is a socket has no actual information about what specific task
owns it as it might be owned by multiple tasks simultaneously.  So, I
cannot check for PTRACE_MODE_READ as I have only "struct cred*", not
"struct task_struct*".  Some LSMs use only cred part of task, but SMACK
already uses some information from task_struct, so changing ptrace and LSM
interface is impossible.

Manual check for {e,r,fs,s}{u,g}id and capabilities via
cap_ptrace_access_check() might not be sufficient because of possible
additional LSM restrictions and policies.

I feel doubt whether ptrace_may_access() may be changed to something
more simple.  Both -ow and -grsecurity use changed posix permissions and
gid on procfs files, so maybe just match subject's euid vs. object's uid?



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