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Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2019 18:07:03 +0100
From: Jim Fenton <fenton@...epopcorn.net>
To: passwords@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: UX/security of TOTP configuration process
I’m not sure what you mean by “anti-pattern”, but I would provide one-time recovery codes but not provide support for transferring the 2FA secret in the app. But recognize that some users may transfer the 2FA secret anyway.
-Jim
> On Mar 29, 2019, at 5:52 PM, Anton Dedov <adedov@...il.com> wrote:
>
> So, keeping TOTP secret as a backup should be considered anti-pattern?
>
> Thanks
>
> пт, 29 мар. 2019 г., 19:50 Jim Fenton <fenton@...epopcorn.net>:
>> Many TOTP agents have mechanisms for transferring the secret from one device to another (for example, when a user’s smartphone is replaced). This is somewhat out of control of the application using TOTP (and unfortunately some of these applications do not do this transfer in a fully 2FA manner, but again that is out of the application’s control).
>>
>> But I think it’s good to provide one-time recovery codes in case the user can’t transfer the recovery secret.
>>
>> -Jim
>>
>> > On Mar 29, 2019, at 5:03 PM, Anton Dedov <adedov@...il.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > Hello folks!
>> >
>> > A question on implementing TOTP 2FA in an application.
>> >
>> > Is it ok to ask users to backup TOTP secret in a secure place during 2fa configuration process? Or it's better to provide one-time recovery codes?
>> >
>> > The argument against TOTP secret backup can be an assumption that if the secret leak it can be maliciously used without victim user ever noticing it.
>> >
>> > --
>> > Anton Dedov
>>
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