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Message-ID: <5672e594-1c0e-4028-83f7-61532c4e02bf@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 21:33:51 -0600 From: Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281@...il.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@...auckland.ac.nz> Subject: Re: "sshole": password authentication bypass: OpenSSH + musl libc On 11/6/26 00:35, Peter Gutmann wrote: > Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com> writes: > >> One general comment that does not fit well into most of the discussions around >> sshole... > Another contributing factor, "sshd borrows bob's salt" and the derived > changes, was the quaint 1970s notion that no-one would ever be able to guess > that there exist account names like root, daemon, ldap, postfix, apache, > mysql, sshd, and rumpelstiltskin, so we'll add a kludge to make invalid > accounts take the same time as valid ones. Attackers don't even notice this > because they start with a pregenerated list of known and probable accounts, > but it does help to add vulnerabilities to the password-checking process as > this CVE shows. Does it even entirely work? What if there is no salt to borrow? Thinking about this, I think I see another information leak: does sshd produce a "fake salt" or fail the authentication quickly, thus leaking the fact that no accounts on the box have a valid password? There was a time when a salt could be assumed to exist, but that was before cloud VM images that have no console and therefore can be network-login-with-SSH-key only... -- Jacob
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