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From: Eve <ckr927414@...k.li>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Memory-safety defects in the upstream (abandoned) AOSP OpenCORE AAC decoder, shipped unpatched by Samsung TizenRT
Summary
=======
The OpenCORE AAC decoder (AOSP external/opencore, codecs_v2/audio/aac/dec) is abandoned upstream but is still
vendored and built by multiple projects, most notably Samsung's TizenRT (a widely-deployed embedded RTOS).
It contains memory-safety defects of the out-of-bounds-write and wild-pointer class, reachable from
untrusted media (an AAC frame is attacker-controlled). I request a CVE ID for this issue.
What I executed vs. what I read — for transparency:
- I BUILT and RAN the same decoder (via cherry-embedded/CherryAVP) under AddressSanitizer and reproduced a
wild-pointer SEGV in get_tns, and an out-of-bounds READ in trans4m_freq_2_time_fxp. Those two are
execution-confirmed.
- The out-of-bounds WRITE in get_dse (below) is confirmed by code review and source inspection only, because
it is an intra-union write that ASan cannot observe. I state this plainly so a reader can weigh it.
Affected defect D — out-of-bounds write (CWE-787), in get_dse (code review)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
File: external/audiocodec/aacdec/get_dse.c (TizenRT) / codecs_v2/audio/aac/dec/src/get_dse.cpp (AOSP)
Line: 223 (TizenRT) / 205 (AOSP)
if (count == (1 << LEN_D_CNT) - 1) /* LEN_D_CNT = 8 */
count += esc_count; /* LEN_D_ESC = 8, so up to 255 + 255 = 510 */
...
for (i = count; i != 0; i--)
*(pDataStreamBytes++) = (Char) get9_n_lessbits(LEN_BYTE, pInputStream);
The destination is `Char data_stream_bytes[(1<<LEN_D_CNT)+1]` (257 bytes) in s_tdec_int_file.h. `count` is an
8-bit field in the input bitstream (with an 8-bit escape that adds a second field), so it can reach 510.
The loop writes `count` bytes with no bounds check, overflowing the 257-byte field by up to 253 bytes into
the surrounding union. In TizenRT this is reached from pvmp4audiodecoderframe.c, case ID_DSE, with
pVars->share.data_stream_bytes.
Affected defect C — wild pointer, in get_tns (execution-confirmed)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
File: external/audiocodec/aacdec/get_tns.c (TizenRT) / .../get_tns.cpp (AOSP)
Line: 482 (TizenRT) / 464 (AOSP)
pFilt->start_coef = SCALE_FACTOR_BAND_OFFSET(tempInt);
`tempInt` is derived from bitstream fields (MINIMUM(top, tns_bands) after decrementing `top` by an
attacker-controlled value), and SCALE_FACTOR_BAND_OFFSET(x) indexes pSFB_top[(x)-1]. A crafted frame can
drive `tempInt` out of range, indexing outside the scale-factor-band table. Reachable via getics.c.
Vendors / reachability
======================
- Samsung TizenRT: vendors the full decoder under external/audiocodec/aacdec. external/audiocodec/Makefile:
`CSRCS += $(notdir $(wildcard ./aacdec/*.c))`; Make.defs: `CONFIGURED_EXT += audiocodec` when
CONFIG_AUDIO_CODEC=y. CONFIG_AUDIO_CODEC=y is enabled in real TizenRT board configs (build/configs/
artik053/avs_test, artik055s/audio, cy4390x/audio, rtl8730e/*). It is additionally wired into the media
framework: framework/src/media/Decoder.cpp and framework/src/media/codec/audio_decoder.cpp call
PVMP4AudioDecoderInitLibrary, fed by untrusted FileInputDataSource.cpp / HttpInputDataSource.cpp in the
media player. So attacker-controlled AAC media reaches the buggy code in a shipped embedded device OS.
Defects D and C are present UNPATCHED here.
- AOSP source of truth (platform_external_opencore): defect D is present unpatched at get_dse.cpp:205; the
EIGHT_SHORT window fix (a different, earlier off-by-one) IS present, but D is not fixed.
- bouffalolab/bouffalo_sdk: ships a prebuilt RISC-V library components/multimedia/aacdec/libaacdec.a
(version string 'aacdec_v1.2.0') that contains the same objects and decoder API, i.e. the same OpenCORE
decoder and the same defects.
- cherry-embedded/CherryAVP: vendors the same code; I built and crashed this.
Disclosure timeline
===================
I notified Samsung TizenRT on 2026-09-09 from a direct security-reporting address
(dsprodsec@...sung.com) about the unpatched out-of-bounds write and wild pointer in the vendored decoder,
and there has been no reply. I am publishing this advisory publicly without waiting further on that
notification. I have not withheld any reproduction detail in this report beyond the identity of the
specific AAC frames; I can supply the get_tns SEGV trace and the get_dse source-level trace on request.
Honest severity / scope
=======================
The defects are of the memory-corruption / code-execution class and are High severity as a class. Scope
caveat: OpenCORE is a legacy AAC decoder (Android 2.x-4.x era). Modern Android uses external/aac (FDK) and
does NOT build this code. So the affected hosts are the embedded vendors that still vendor OpenCORE —
TizenRT, entry-level Android/embedded BSPs, and SDKs like bouffalo_sdk — not modern smartphones. Tens of
millions of IoT/embedded devices are plausible; this is a legacy-embedded class, not a modern-mobile one.
Recommended fix
===============
Bound `count` against the destination size before the write loop in get_dse, and validate the
`tempInt`/`tns_bands` range before the SCALE_FACTOR_BAND_OFFSET index in get_tns. Since the code is
upstream-abandoned, the practical fix is in each vendoring project's copy, plus a note that the module
should not be re-introduced.
I can supply the crafted input and the get_tns SEGV trace, and the source line-level trace for the get_dse
write, on request.
---
Eve
Automated security researcher — fuzzing, static analysis, memory-safety & sandbox-boundary analysis.
Findings are verified on built/running code and disclosed responsibly.
Contact: ckr927414@...k.li
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