|
|
Message-ID: <CAHxebFY2NJp4BMVA6ed-G=E_SPjSTJ3mcpXm+BJHc+4-CzuHSw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 16:50:52 -0700 From: Samuel Karp <sam@...uelkarp.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: [containerd] Patch releases addressing CVE-2026-50195, CVE-2026-53488, CVE-2026-53492, CVE-2026-53489, and CVE-2026-47262 Hello, Patch releases of containerd are now available at https://github.com/containerd/containerd/releases which address the following CVEs: CVE-2026-50195 (Critical) - https://github.com/containerd/containerd/security/advisories/GHSA-cvxm-645q-p574 containerd's CRI checkpoint import process contains a vulnerability where it fails to validate the image references specified within a checkpoint image's configuration. An attacker with permissions to create pods can use a crafted checkpoint image to force containerd to pull a malicious image and assign it an arbitrary local tag, thereby poisoning the node's local image cache. Subsequently, if other pods on the same node attempt to use the poisoned tag with an IfNotPresent (or Never) pull policy, they will unknowingly execute the attacker's malicious image instead of the legitimate one. This can lead to a compromise of the affected pods, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code under the victim pod's identity. This bug has been fixed in the following containerd versions: 2.3.2 2.2.5 2.1.9 Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue. The containerd project would like to thank Henry Beberman (@hbeberman) of Microsoft, the GKE Security Team using Gemini, Anthropic Research, in collaboration with Claude, and Robert Prast (@robertprast) who independently discovered and responsibly disclosed this issue in accordance with the containerd security policy. CVE-2026-53488 (Critical) - https://github.com/containerd/containerd/security/advisories/GHSA-xhf5-7wjv-pqxp A bug was found in containerd where the CRI plugin propagates labels from an image config (LABEL instruction in Dockerfile) to a container without validation. This may result in executing an arbitrary command on the host, via a plugin that consumes container labels for some operations. This bug has been fixed in the following containerd versions: 2.3.2 2.2.5 2.1.9 2.0.10 1.7.33 Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue. The containerd project would like to thank Anthropic Research, in collaboration with Claude, the GKE Security Team using Gemini, and Robert Prast (@robertprast) for independently discovering and responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the containerd security policy. CVE-2026-53492 (Critical) - https://github.com/containerd/containerd/security/advisories/GHSA-33vj-92qq-66hc containerd's CRI implementation improperly trusts Container Device Interface (CDI) annotations found within untrusted checkpoint image metadata during container restoration. When restoring a container from a checkpoint, containerd preserves CDI-related annotations from the checkpoint archive rather than relying solely on the pod's create-time specification. This allows a user with pod creation permissions to bypass standard Kubernetes resource allocation and device plugin enforcement, injecting arbitrary CDI edits (such as device nodes and host mounts) into the restored container. Successful exploitation requires that the node has CDI enabled and contains a matching host CDI specification for the requested device; environments where CDI is disabled or lacking sensitive device specifications are not affected. This bug has been fixed in the following containerd versions: 2.3.2 2.2.5 2.1.9 Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue. Recreating existing containers restored from untrusted checkpoints may be necessary to remove smuggled configuration. The containerd project would like to thank Robert Prast (@robertprast) for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the containerd security policy. CVE-2026-53489 (High) - https://github.com/containerd/containerd/security/advisories/GHSA-rgh6-rfwx-v388 A bug was found in containerd where the CRI plugin restores container.log from a checkpoint image without validating a symlinked path. This could result in reading an arbitrary file on the host via kubectl logs. This bug has been fixed in the following containerd versions: 2.3.2 2.2.5 2.1.9 Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue. The containerd project would like to thank @gouldnicholas and @davidrxchester, Yuming Zhang and Song Li of Zhejiang University, Sangwon Ryu (@sangwon090), Henry Beberman (@hbeberman) of Microsoft, the GKE Security Team using Gemini, Anthropic Research, in collaboration with Claude, Robert Prast (@robertprast), Kyle Elliott (@kyle-elliott-tob) of Trail of Bits, and Zhenchen Wang (@Plucky923), who independently discovered and responsibly disclosed this issue in accordance with the containerd security policy. CVE-2026-47262 (Moderate) - https://github.com/containerd/containerd/security/advisories/GHSA-jpcc-p29g-p8mq A vulnerability in containerd allows a maliciously crafted image to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) condition. When creating a container from this image, memory exhaustion occurs, leading to an Out Of Memory (OOM) kill of the containerd process. This renders the container runtime API unavailable and can disrupt clients such as the Docker Engine or Kubernetes control-plane components. This bug has been fixed in the following containerd versions: 2.3.2 2.2.5 2.1.9 2.0.10 1.7.33 Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue. The containerd project would like to thank Jakub Ciolek (@jake-ciolek) at AlphaSense and Kyle Elliott @ Trail of Bits who independently discovered and responsibly disclosed this issue in accordance with the containerd security policy. containerd security policy: https://github.com/containerd/project/blob/main/SECURITY.md If you have any questions or comments about these advisories: * Open an issue in containerd: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/issues/new/choose * Email us at security@...tainerd.io To report a security issue in containerd: * Report a new vulnerability: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/security/advisories/new * Email us at security@...tainerd.io On behalf of the containerd project, Samuel Karp
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.