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Message-ID: <d59c163cb176305c312601412b76b765@free.fr>
Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 13:35:54 +0200
From: gabriel.corona@...e.fr
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: On the issue of MIME handlers that execute
arbitrary code (e.g. Wine)
> I wonder if it would be worth proposing a change to whatever system
> component handles opening files (probably something in Glib, or
> xdg-utils, haven't researched that deeply yet), so that handlers cannot
> be registered for certain "dangerous" file types (i.e. ELF/PE/Mach-O
> executables, scripts in various languages, etc.)? The only real
> downside I can see to that is the inability to text editors to
> register themselves as handlers for script MIME types, and in those
> instances, the editor can register itself as the handler for another
> applicable, more generic MIME type (i.e. text/plain), then change its
> behavior based on the more detailed MIME type of the file after it
> opens it.
Applications which actually want to associate file with arbitrary code
execution
(or other potentially malicious actions), can register a wrapper :
Exec=wine-prompt %F
# Alternatively: Exec=wine --prompt-user %F
This wrapper can warn of the security implications and ask for
confirmation,
similar to how most file manager now ask for confirmation before
executing
a native executable or a .desktop file.
The .desktop format could be extended with an additional entry such as:
# bike-shed name:
Unsafe-Exec=wine %F
A caller not implementing this extension, would ignore this line and
call the
prompt wrapper.
A caller implementing this extension, could ask for confirmation itself
and then call the unsafe command.
Gabriel
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