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Message-ID: <CALGJVMHdVPLfzXCzYpZr0zASh2SwxDj8PsECmptCQSEx5pj2sQ@mail.gmail.com> Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 15:52:22 +0500 From: Ali Raza <aliraza@...erock.io> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Agno's PythonTools: Path traversal leads to sensitive information disclosure and potential RCE ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Yuvaraj Shanmugam <yuvi@...o.com> Date: Thu, Jan 8, 2026 at 7:49 PM Subject: Re: Found a Critical Vulnerability in Agno's PythonTools To: Ali Raza <aliraza@...erock.io> Cc: <support@...o.com> Hi Ali, Thank you for sharing this critical vulnerability report regarding PythonTools and for providing the detailed proof-of-concept. We appreciate you bringing this to our attention! Best, Yuvaraj On Wed, 7 Jan 2026 at 10:14, 'Ali Raza' via Agno Support <support@...o.com> wrote: > Hi Team, > > Happy New Year! > > We have identified and confirmed a critical path traversal vulnerability > that leads to sensitive information disclosure and potential Remote Code > Execution (RCE). > > Specifically, PythonTools in libs/agno/agno/tools/python.py constructs > file paths using self.base_dir.joinpath(file_name) without validating that > the resolved path remains within base_dir. An attacker controlling the tool > input (either directly or via an agent prompt) can use ../ to traverse the > file system to read, write, or execute files. > > Please see the attached proof-of-concept code snippet, which utilizes > existing cookbook examples to demonstrate this issue. > [image: image.png] > > We intend to post a detailed advisory report on GitHub under the > repository's security advisories, provide a patch, and request a CVE number. > > Please let us know if you require any additional information from us. > > Best regards, > > Ali Raza (a.k.a locus-x64) > Vulnerability Researcher > [image: image.png] > ------------------------------ Hi Team, I am forwarding details regarding a critical path traversal vulnerability identified in Agno's PythonTools. The vulnerability resides in libs/agno/agno/tools/python.py, where file paths are constructed using self.base_dir.joinpath(file_name) without proper validation. This allows an attacker to traverse the file system to read, write, or execute files. Please note that a patch has already been implemented by the maintainers in the following commit: https://github.com/agno-agi/agno/commit/710d7e7f846f93b7a3eadfd3e77075428c39e803 We are currently waiting for a CVE to be assigned to this issue. Best, Ali Raza Vulnerability Researcher Content of type "text/html" skipped Download attachment "image.png" of type "image/png" (114055 bytes) Download attachment "image.png" of type "image/png" (3464 bytes)
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