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Message-ID: <CALj3r0garTYmNZeTJaKUcpUUaxiv+-5nWfaihikxRBrFSXOt7A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2026 00:28:51 +0800
From: Coia Prant <coiaprant@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, security@...e.com,
team@...urity.debian.org, secalert@...hat.com
Subject: Re: CVE-2025-68121: Regression and Incomplete Fix for Go TLS Session Resumption
Correction: The current official patch is not CL 735051
See https://go.dev/issue/77113
Coia Prant <coiaprant@...il.com> 于2026年1月18日周日 00:20写道：
>
> Hi,
>
> I am the original reporter of the vulnerabilities recently addressed
> in Go 1.25.6/1.24.x (CVE-2025-61730, CVE-2025-68121).
>
> I am writing to inform the community that the official fix provided by
> the Go security team is critically flawed and causes significant
> regressions in the networking ecosystem (notably breaking quic-go).
>
> 1. Missing Root Cause in Official Advisory
>
> The official advisory attributes the risk to "misuse of APIs," but the
> root cause is a fundamental logic error in Go's TLS 1.3 state machine
> during session resumption.
>
> Specifically, it fails to re-validate the identity of the trust anchor
> when a session is resumed, allowing for Cross-CA certificate bypass.
>
> 2. Flawed Patch Implementation
>
> The current official patch (CL 735051) contains amateurish errors that
> undermine its effectiveness:
>
> Incorrect Indexing: It attempts to verify peerCertificates instead of
> the verifiedChain (that include RootCA).
>
> Ecosystem Breakage: By aggressively blocking Config.Clone logic to
> "fix" the issue, it has paralyzed 0-RTT and session resumption in the
> QUIC ecosystem.
>
> 3. Proposed O(1) Solution
>
> I have proposed a far more elegant solution that performs a
> constant-time SHA-224 fingerprint check of the root CA.
>
> This fixes the vulnerability without breaking the Config.Clone
> semantics or performance.
>
> Details and Discussion:
>
> https://github.com/golang/go/issues/77217
>
> I encourage downstream maintainers (SUSE, Red Hat, Debian) to review
> the fix before deploying it to mission-critical infrastructure.
>
> Best regards,
> Coia Prant (rbqvq)
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