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Message-ID: <56111.1759117813@cvs.openbsd.org> Date: Sun, 28 Sep 2025 21:50:13 -0600 From: "Theo de Raadt" <deraadt@...nbsd.org> To: Damien Miller <djm@...drot.org> cc: "Adiletta, Andrew" <ajadiletta@....edu>, Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>, "oss-security@...ts.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>, "openssh@...nssh.com" <openssh@...nssh.com>, "Tol, Caner" <mtol@....edu>, "Sunar, Berk" <sunar@....edu>, "Doroz, Yarkin" <ydoroz@....edu>, "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@...rtesan.com>, "pgut001@...auckland.ac.nz" <pgut001@...auckland.ac.nz> Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Damien Miller <djm@...drot.org> wrote: > On Sun, 28 Sep 2025, Adiletta, Andrew wrote: > > > Theo, > > > > Even after two years we stand behind our paper and the contributions > > as outlined. There is nothing more natural for any vulnerability > > researcher to evaluate the most widely used products. If we had doubts > > about the claim or any of the POCs, we would have simply not included > > them in the paper. > > Again, the POCs were not against OpenSSH but your modified version and > you did not demonstrate any of the techniques that you suppose could > have been used to make the attack viable against the unmodified product. > Your abstract therefore clearly overstates the extent of your work. > > The fact that someone filed this CVE based on your paper demonstrates > that it is misleading. I don't think the CVE was filed because of the misleading abstract. Rather, it was due to the misleading contents saying that OpenSSH is vulnerable, with a large amount of effort shown, and text explaining it. Many readers will finish reading without understand how extremely artificial the demonstration is. So to refresh -- OpenSSH is not vulnerable, but the paper says it is. Downstream OpenSSH in Redhat, Debian, Cisco routers, etc etc are also not vulnerable to the artificial demonstrator. The claims about other methods lack proof. Demonstrate those methods working, or retract the claims. OpenSSH was probably not chosen as an example because it is widely used, but because of the strong academic reputation to be collected from publishing a viable attack against OpenSSH..... except such an attack is not actually demonstrated. Many of us understand the zeal to explain single-bit flips against in-memory variables with value 0/1 versus the benefit of variables with greater bit-spread, but the bogus OpenSSH side-study is a distraction which should not have landed in this paper. Andrew, I think your proposal to change the abstract is not sufficient. I think the paper needs a retraction of all the claims against OpenSSH; alternatively you could complete a demonstration of those described theoretical methods working against a real, unmodified OpenSSH, exploit it and become rightously famous. At the moment, you are becoming famous for doing this wrong.
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