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Message-ID: <b379213c-55d1-4564-90aa-591edf3097c7@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2025 23:38:30 -0400
From: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Linux kernel: HFS+ filesystem implementation
issues, exposure in distros
On 6/2/25 22:59, Solar Designer wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Muhammed Hüsam Alzeyya, CC'ed here, (kind of) brought an issue in the
> Linux kernel's HFS+ filesystem implementation to s@k.o and linux-distros
> at once. This is against both Linux kernel's and linux-distros' current
> instructions, which ask to "notify the kernel security team first, wait
> for the fix, and only then notify linux-distros or oss-security". The
> message didn't actually get through to linux-distros for a technical
> reason, but a reply quoting its portion did. I promptly sent a reply to
> Muhammed (CC'ing linux-distros) to explain the situation and ask a few
> questions, but got no reply. I saw no further communication on this.
> (I also checked our server logs, and as far as I can tell there were no
> further rejected/filtered messages from Muhammed's address, neither to
> linux-distros nor to my address.) I am now bringing this to
> oss-security for the sake of transparency and not to make an exception,
> as well as possibly to have a discussion of the general issues.
>
> There was another issue in the same driver publicized a few months ago,
> with a lot of detail on its exploitation (and the exploit itself):
>
> https://ssd-disclosure.com/ssd-advisory-linux-kernel-hfsplus-slab-out-of-bounds-write/
>
> The above post is very lengthy. I'll quote just some pieces below:
>
>> SSD Advisory - Linux kernel hfsplus slab-out-of-bounds Write
>> March 18, 2025
>> SSD Secure Disclosure technical team
>> Vulnerability publication
>>
>> Summary
>> This advisory describes an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Linux kernel that achieves local privilege escalation on Ubuntu 22.04 for active user sessions.
>>
>> Credit
>> An independent security researcher working with SSD Secure Disclosure.
>>
>> Vendor Response
>> Ubuntu has released the following advisory and fix: https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2025-0927
>>
>> Affected Versions
>> Linux Kernel, up to 6.12.0
>> Ubuntu 22.04 with Linux Kernel 6.5.0-18-generic
>>
>> CVE
>> CVE-2025-0927
>
>> * Attila Szasz <szasza.contact@...il.com>
>> * @4ttil4sz1a
>> *
>> * Exploit for hfs+ slab out of bounds write
>> * targeting Linux kernel 6.5
>
> So I'm also CC'ing Attila Szasz here.
>
> The kernel security team ended up rejecting the CVE:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2025033057-CVE-2025-0927-1436@gregkh/T/#u
>
>> Filesystem bugs due to corrupt images are not considered a CVE for any
>> filesystem that is only mountable by CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user
>> namespace. That includes delegated mounting.
If nothing else, this can be used to bypass UEFI Secure Boot.
> However, Ubuntu fixed the issue in many of their kernels, with note:
>
>> While the upstream kernel developers don't consider exploitable
>> corrupted filesystem images to be a security issue, Ubuntu ships with a
>> polkit rule allowing console users to automount removable media, so we
>> do want to fix this issue for our users.
>
> An issue here is that "allowing console users to automount removable
> media" is a high risk, especially if upstream doesn't intend the code to
> be robust and secure against corrupt or malicious filesystem images.
> Maybe there should at least be an allow-list of filesystem types, which
> would be focused on filesystems most commonly used on removable media?
Which ones would you include?
> Another issue is the disconnect on what's CVE-worthy between upstream
> and the distro. This will keep coming up. Maybe a solution for such
> cases is to assign CVEs against the distro rather than against upstream?
This is the only option I can see kernel.org being okay with, but it
doesn't solve the underlying problem. kernel.org's view of what is
(and is not) a vulnerability in a filesystem is severely out of touch
with what distros actually do, and that includes security-conscious
distros like ChromiumOS.
> The linux-cve-announce thread above suggests that upstream may assign
> CVEs to filesystem implementation issues for corruptions that pass fsck.
> So theoretically a way for a distro to avoid relying on robustness and
> security of kernel code beyond what upstream cares about would be to
> force fsck before mounting a filesystem. However, doing that even for
> filesystems that claim to be clean (as it would be required for
> security) is impractical. Also, would the CVEs (and eventual fixes) be
> against (for) the kernel or fsck then?
Why is it impractical? Performance?
> Anyway, now the current report by Muhammed is for another issue in
> almost the same place. While Attila's was an out of bounds write, the
> new one is reported as an out of bounds read. So its security relevance
> is not obvious even on systems like Ubuntu that expose this code for
> attack. This depends on what's done with the value read out of bounds.
>
> Below is the portion of Muhammed's message that got to linux-distros:
>
>> Re: VULNERABILITY REPORT: Out-of-Bounds Read in HFS+ Filesystem's hfsplus_bnode_read Function
>
> On Sun, May 25, 2025 at 01:30:18PM +0800, Muhammed Hüsam Alzeyya wrote:
>> ## Summary
>>
>> A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel's HFS+
>> filesystem implementation. Specifically, the vulnerability is located in
>> the `hfsplus_bnode_read` function in `fs/hfsplus/bnode.c`. When handling an
>> HFS+ filesystem, this vulnerability allows reading beyond the bounds of an
>> allocated memory region. The issue is triggered when the kernel attempts to
>> delete a file on a specially crafted HFS+ filesystem, which can lead to
>> memory corruption, information leakage, and potential privilege escalation.
>
>> ## Affected Environments
>>
>> This vulnerability affects:
>> - Linux kernel 6.15.0-rc2 (confirmed)
>> - Potentially earlier versions that include the HFS+ filesystem
>> implementation
>> - Any system that allows mounting of HFS+ filesystems, especially if
>> untrusted users can provide filesystem images
>
> Alexander
There are three filesystems that *must* be secure against malicious
images to avoid very serious problems:
1. FAT32, as this is used by the UEFI System Partition and
so must be mounted by every UEFI-based system.
2. F2FS, as this is used by Android for its writable storage.
3. ext4, as this is used by ChromiumOS for its writable storage.
In all three cases, a malicious filesystem image can be used to
bypass secure boot. UEFI secure boot is often considered quite
weak and I tend to agree with this, but Android and ChromiumOS
have very strong verified boot mechanisms and being able to break
them is without question worthy of a CVE. ChromeOS Security
has confirmed that they do indeed consider "attacker corrupts
writable storage to get code execution when the machine reboots"
to be in scope for their threat model.
The only way I can think of to fix this issue is not technical,
but organizational: somehow ensure that the burden of dealing
with these bugs falls onto those who care about them, rather
than on overworked filesystem maintainers. Is there any way
that this could reasonably be done? Could the Android and
ChromeOS security teams triage *and fix* bugs involving crafted
images *without* the filesystem maintainers having to be
involved? Or is the solution for the parties who care about
these vulnerabilities to completely reimplement the filesystems
in Rust and/or using FUSE?
--
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
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