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Message-Id: <E1uJt5c-007iTv-2W@xenbits.xenproject.org> Date: Tue, 27 May 2025 12:07:28 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security-team-members@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 468 v3 (CVE-2025-27462,CVE-2025-27463,CVE-2025-27464) - WinPVDrivers: Excessive permissions on user-exposed devices -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2025-27462,CVE-2025-27463,CVE-2025-27464 / XSA-468 version 3 WinPVDrivers: Excessive permissions on user-exposed devices UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= The Windows PV drivers expose various facilities to userspace. Several of these have no security descriptor, and are therefore fully accessible to unprivileged users. These are: 1. XenCons, CVE-2025-27462 2. XenIface, CVE-2025-27463 3. XenBus, CVE-2025-27464 IMPACT ====== Unprivileged users inside the guest can escalate privilege to that of the guest kernel. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== All Windows virtual machines running the Windows PV drivers are vulnerable. The xencons driver was first available in the 9.0.0 release, and is vulnerable since its introduction. The xeniface and xenbus drivers are vulnerable in all releases. MITIGATION ========== A PowerShell script to mitigate the issue in the XenIface driver has been developed. It is a single-shot script which can either scan for the vulnerabilities, or fix them by inserting the relevant security descriptors into the registry and the running device objects. See the script for full invocation information. Because attaching PowerShell scripts to emails causes them to be rejected by several major service providers, the script is instead available from: https://paste.vates.tech/?415ce4adb9dde353#6REZBQosbawepd8RcCWrhZ5H3euYSNXGcfHr6hrwU2om password: 79322bc8-94fe-42f6-8b81-8373fa9458d0 sha256: db45e6123312cf9a3a2136f903f82826556915b76b5149b00eeefbe0a2912107 It has only been lightly reviewed by the Xen Security Team. Feedback welcome. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Tu Dinh of Vates RESOLUTION ========== Applying the attached paches resolves this issue. xsa468/xenbus-01.patch Windows xenbus xsa468/xencons-0?.patch Windows xencons xsa468/xeniface-0?.patch Windows xeniface Note: xeniface-03 and 04 are not being treated as security issues, but are included for downstreams wishing to include them in the same WHQL testing run. $ sha256sum xsa468*/* 3c4fbc0526c2a099e0866f9483c545605ab30c7bae8cfbfc7deea7f491b34ac3 xsa468/xenbus-01.patch 7336ce0fd1df73921ec4246bf71ccd8709a8fae20c056e7aba231f34ebccefc9 xsa468/xencons-01.patch bbacf952c8f78ec6d0ea8ae25d6b1a5e4789c651bfbe6a357adbfc681c49809f xsa468/xencons-02.patch 0e65525d0a89d693b0b62074e593be332a431cbe245aa8f7d94db4f93a0e7c78 xsa468/xeniface-01.patch d9193ea2f120281b3ff0886f65ab87723520577826a347db539ef8904eaffa02 xsa468/xeniface-02.patch f5a6da368cd0114e8d462d7959590e2abff0523574091427896d7092face0e6a xsa468/xeniface-03.patch 01fadfd4906db35a14cba6d17cc2d28020f554564741c764db876dca43205ad3 xsa468/xeniface-04.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of patches or mitigations is NOT permitted (except where all the affected systems and VMs are administered and used only by organisations which are members of the Xen Project Security Issues Predisclosure List). Specifically, deployment on public cloud systems is NOT permitted. This is because the fixes change in-guest behaviour. Deployment is permitted only AFTER the embargo ends. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFABAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAmg1o+EMHHBncEB4ZW4u b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZB4IH+QGuIpu1qNVMNNL6rsWSHXJO764VIS8nn6sadMPI heKoqWr9RMzPZsFDK5qWtckUR4Mfloj/3OD3VDb7a+qeeHFRHCvtpJ5L+q+JYAW6 5Fi5mGqNxTZWjCiwyKtKpJqRj7xSSb49TAi7BrshToV5jD66IyKUW44qFEeXPrs8 KTg2M3MhOO+OJrnHZHcKbhXd2IyhcYL96wg6KteVoQb35uyiDRpj1/mT4BQvp03n 3MJe3uQCavorEPiiWk+Zy/DXSBzFsGpsCSwGOYgjC7HZfWvtsmWeREQhai32LpBi HW7yufiHwn/sC4hJT98CR1UvH/IJRbEG4kqVX4J6dxau9bw= =QxLI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "xsa468/xenbus-01.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (2829 bytes) Download attachment "xsa468/xencons-01.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (3048 bytes) Download attachment "xsa468/xencons-02.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (4603 bytes) Download attachment "xsa468/xeniface-01.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (3637 bytes) Download attachment "xsa468/xeniface-02.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (1494 bytes) Download attachment "xsa468/xeniface-03.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (2180 bytes) Download attachment "xsa468/xeniface-04.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (784 bytes)
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