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Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2024 16:37:48 -0000 (UTC)
From: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise

On 2024-03-29, Ivan Delalande wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 08:51:26AM -0700, Andres Freund wrote:
>> For which the exploit code was then adjusted:
>> https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/commit/6e636819e8f070330d835fce46289a3ff72a7b89
>> 
>> Given the activity over several weeks, the committer is either directly
>> involved or there was some quite severe compromise of their
>> system. Unfortunately the latter looks like the less likely explanation, given
>> they communicated on various lists about the "fixes" mentioned above.
>
> Knowing this, I hope the recent kernel patch series involving the same
> person to some degree will get extra scrutiny:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240320183846.19475-1-lasse.collin@tukaani.org/t/
>
> Thanks Andres, incredible find and write-up!
>

It was also pointed out they submitted an odd PR to libarchive:

https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/1609

In summary, they replaced calls to safe_fprintf() with fprintf() --
meaning control characters are no longer filtered from errors. That
seems pretty minor, but now that we know they were in the business of
obfuscating the presence of backdoors -- seems a bit suspicious.

Regardless, that change has now been reverted:

https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/2101

Tavis.

-- 
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