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Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 21:58:31 -0400
From: Marc Deslauriers <marc.deslauriers@...onical.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh
server compromise
On 2024-03-29 19:49, Tavis Ormandy wrote:
> On 2024-03-29, Marc Deslauriers wrote:
>>> I think we should have a policy that if issues are suspected to be actively exploited, that the issue goes public immediately. If even there is no patch or mitigation, there's not a lot of benefit to keeping it private.
>>
>> In this case, we had no reason to believe it was being actively exploited.
>>
>
> Yeah... but you also have no reason to not believe that?
>
> What do you propose they were doing with their backdoor?
They were still attempting to get it into distros,
>
>> If you make it public before a patch or mitigation is available, it has now gone
>> from a single entity being able to exploit it to the whole world being able to
>> exploit it.
>>
>> That's a whole lot worse.
>>
>
> Okay, but do we agree that if there is a mitigation available, it's better
> for it to be public?
>
> Isn't doing `dnf downgrade xxx` a mitigation, or `systemctl xxx stop`?
All we knew was that a payload was being attached to liblzma, it took a while to
get the other details. We wanted to make sure it wasn't propagating to packages
it compressed.
It wasn't obvious at the time that simply reverting to the previous version
would be a complete solution, and I don't think telling everyone to stop ssh on
all their servers and cloud instances is a viable mitigation at all.
>
>>>
>>> I think everyone was acting in good faith here and did great work, but there wasn't a clear policy for handling this type of issue.
>>
>>
>> I would argue against having a policy requiring something like this to be made
>> public immediately. The important thing here is to do whatever it takes to make
>> sure users are secure as fast as possible, not expose them to even bigger attack
>> surface with no mitigation available.
>>
>> Marc.
>
> We all want users to be secure as fast as possible. The discussion is
> whether keeping backdoors embargoed helps achieve that.
It took a day to figure out what it was, what the impact was, and how to get it
fixed, at which point there was agreement it shouldn't be keep embargoed. Nobody
was pushing for it to be embargoed any longer than it needed to be.
Marc.
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