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Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 21:14:02 +0000
From: terraminator <terraminator@...tonmail.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>
Subject: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise
I can confirm your observation:
there is no relevant difference between the "patched" and the affected version on arch linux.
48,49c48,49
< 000002f0: 0300 0000 474e 5500 71f9 a255 f686 4e44 ....GNU.q..U..ND
< 00000300: c325 3a10 dc37 9c25 c8bf b302 0000 0000 .%:..7.%........
---
> 000002f0: 0300 0000 474e 5500 69df 3c77 1c62 8668 ....GNU.i.<w.b.h
> 00000300: 86ef f245 d5b1 5834 540d f808 0000 0000 ...E..X4T.......
12804c12804
< 00032030: 2e36 2e31 2e64 6562 7567 0000 82fd 6f66 .6.1.debug....of
---
> 00032030: 2e36 2e31 2e64 6562 7567 0000 4ad1 cc28 .6.1.debug..J..(
Terraminator
Rein Fernhout (Levitating) <me@...itati.ng> schrieb am Freitag, 29. März 2024 um 21:46:
> > so I would appreciate it if somebody else confirms my conclusion.
>
>
> I can confirm there is no difference in the disassembly of libzlma in
> Archlinux packages 5.6.1-1 and 5.6.1-2.
>
> This is the difference of the hexdumps as created by xxd:
>
> 48,49c48,49
> < 000002f0: 0300 0000 474e 5500 71f9 a255 f686 4e44 ....GNU.q..U..ND
> < 00000300: c325 3a10 dc37 9c25 c8bf b302 0000 0000 .%:..7.%........
> ---
>
> > 000002f0: 0300 0000 474e 5500 69df 3c77 1c62 8668 ....GNU.i.<w.b.h
> > 00000300: 86ef f245 d5b1 5834 540d f808 0000 0000 ...E..X4T.......
>
> 12804c12804
> < 00032030: 2e36 2e31 2e64 6562 7567 0000 82fd 6f66 .6.1.debug....of
> ---
>
> > 00032030: 2e36 2e31 2e64 6562 7567 0000 4ad1 cc28 .6.1.debug..J..(
>
>
> The commit that updated the pkgrel can be seen here:
>
> https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/xz/-/commit/881385757abdc39d3cfea1c3e34ec09f637424ad
>
> 5.6.1-1 was build from the tarball found in releases but 5.6.1-2 is not.
>
> On 2024-03-29 21:18, Alexander E. Patrakov wrote:
>
> > On Sat, Mar 30, 2024 at 2:59 AM Alexander E. Patrakov
> > patrakov@...il.com wrote:
> >
> > > On Sat, Mar 30, 2024 at 12:09 AM Andres Freund andres@...razel.de
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > == Affected Systems ==
> > > >
> > > > The attached de-obfuscated script is invoked first after configure, where it
> > > > decides whether to modify the build process to inject the code.
> > > >
> > > > These conditions include...
> > > > <snip>
> > > > Running as part of a debian or RPM package build:
> > > > if test -f "$srcdir/debian/rules" || test "x$RPM_ARCH" = "xx86_64";then
> > >
> > > Could you please confirm that the Arch Linux binary package was never
> > > actually compromised?
> >
> > Answering my own question. Supposedly (as "confirmed" by
> > https://lists.archlinux.org/archives/list/arch-security@lists.archlinux.org/thread/R3HBBSVYIRTXB4O64N2WZX55BF6IIPST/),
> > "package xz before version 5.6.1-2 is vulnerable". So, I downloaded
> > versions 5.6.1-1 (supposedly vulnerable) and 5.6.1-2 (supposedly
> > fixed) from Arch Linux Archive:
> > https://archive.archlinux.org/packages/x/xz/
> >
> > I extracted both binary packages and disassembled the liblzma.so.5.6.1
> > library contained therein using "objdump -d". The files are not
> > identical, however, their disassembly is. Therefore, either both are
> > trojaned, or none. Based on the "if test -f "$srcdir/debian/rules" ||
> > test "x$RPM_ARCH" = "xx86_64";then" line, I think that the correct
> > answer is "none", and therefore no advisory should have been created.
> > But it's 4:18am here, not the best time to think, so I would
> > appreciate it if somebody else confirms my conclusion.
> >
> > P.S. Kudos to the reproducible-builds project for making the analysis
> > that easy.
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