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Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2024 02:59:14 +0800
From: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh
server compromise
On Sat, Mar 30, 2024 at 12:09 AM Andres Freund <andres@...razel.de> wrote:
> == Affected Systems ==
>
> The attached de-obfuscated script is invoked first after configure, where it
> decides whether to modify the build process to inject the code.
>
> These conditions include...
<snip>
> Running as part of a debian or RPM package build:
> if test -f "$srcdir/debian/rules" || test "x$RPM_ARCH" = "xx86_64";then
Could you please confirm that the Arch Linux binary package was never
actually compromised?
> openssh does not directly use liblzma. However debian and several other
> distributions patch openssh to support systemd notification, and libsystemd
> does depend on lzma.
<snip>
> Observed requirements for the exploit:
> b) argv[0] needs to be /usr/sbin/sshd
I have checked, and found that Arch Linux does not apply any patches
when building OpenSSH.
P.S. in the detect.sh script, the "set -eu" line plays a bad trick: it
aborts the check if sshd is not actually linked to liblzma.
--
Alexander E. Patrakov
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