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Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 10:04:53 +0200
From: Matthias Gerstner <>
Subject: Cadence: Fixed /tmp path issues; no longer maintained by upstream
 (CVE-2023-43782, CVE-2023-43783)

Hello list,

this is a report about two fixed temporary file path issues in the Cadence [1]
tools for audio production. There are no upstream fixes available since the
upstream author considers this project as deprecated and mostly no longer
necessary. The GitHub project has consequently been archived as a response to
my report of these security issues.

Cadence is still packaged on a number of Linux distributions though (e.g.
Gentoo, openSUSE, Fedora, Arch). Our openSUSE Cadence package maintainer
informed me that there still exist some use cases for which there is no proper
replacement for Cadence yet, when using the Jack audio system [2].

This detailed report and the CVE assignments are mostly intended to make the
community aware that there are issues in Cadence and that it is no longer
maintained, thus it should be moved away from. For short term fixes I have
attached two patches that address the two issues outlined in this report.

1) CVE-2023-43782: Use of Fixed Temporary File Path in /tmp/.cadence-aloop-daemon.x

This temporary file is used in `` and ``. It
is used to control the starting and stopping of the aloop daemon.

- in only the `stat()` and `unlink()` system calls are used on this
  path. Symlink attacks should not be possible.
- in `` `mknod()` is used to create this file. This
  system call is pretty safe against following symlinks as well.
- the content of the file is not evaluated by any of the scripts.

In `` the use of the file is as follows:

    checkFile = "/tmp/.cadence-aloop-daemon.x"
    # Create check file
    if not os.path.exists(checkFile):
    while doLoop and os.path.exists(checkFile):
    if os.path.exists(checkFile):

If the file already exists (created by another user in the system) then the
file is used as is. This allows other users in the system to perform a
denial-of-service against the aloop daemon, by pre-creating this file
and removing it at an arbitrary time again, to make the daemon stop.

2) CVE-2023-43783: Use of Fixed Temporary File Path in /tmp/cadence-wineasio.reg

This file is used if Wine is installed on the system and when the Wine ASIO
related settings are changed and applied in the Cadence GUI dialog. In the following code deals with it:

    if "wineasio" in self.settings_changed_types:
        REGFILE  = 'REGEDIT4\n'
        REGFILE += '\n'
        REGFILE += '[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Wine\WineASIO]\n'
        REGFILE += '"Autostart server"=dword:0000000%i\n' % int(1 if self.cb_wineasio_autostart.isChecked() else 0)
        REGFILE += '"Connect to hardware"=dword:0000000%i\n' % int(1 if self.cb_wineasio_hw.isChecked() else 0)
        REGFILE += '"Fixed buffersize"=dword:0000000%i\n' % int(1 if self.cb_wineasio_fixed_bsize.isChecked() else 0)
        REGFILE += '"Number of inputs"=dword:000000%s\n' % smartHex(self.sb_wineasio_ins.value(), 2)
        REGFILE += '"Number of outputs"=dword:000000%s\n' % smartHex(self.sb_wineasio_outs.value(), 2)
        REGFILE += '"Preferred buffersize"=dword:0000%s\n' % smartHex(int(self.cb_wineasio_bsizes.currentText()), 4)
        writeFile = open("/tmp/cadence-wineasio.reg", "w")
        os.system("regedit /tmp/cadence-wineasio.reg")

Without the Linux kernel's symlink protection (`fs.protected_symlinks` sysctl)
this would allow other users to stage a symlink attack. Thus other users could
point /tmp/cadence-wineasio.reg to a compromised file, or have the user
running Cadence create this file in an arbitrary location.

Without the Linux kernel's regular file protection (`fs.protected_regular`
sysctl) this would allow other users to place an attacker controlled
world-writable file in this location. By winning a race condition (waiting for
Cadence to write its desired content and then quickly replacing the file's
content again) the attacker can cause arbitrary data to be passed to
`regedit`. Since the Wine registry controls ample application behaviour this
can be considered a local arbitrary code execution.

Luckily most modern Linux distributions have the kernel protections mentioned
above enabled which means that the worst case will not happen. Even with these
protection mechanisms the following problems remain:

- Cadence can be prevented from saving Wine ASIO settings by pre-creating this
- The file is created world-readable by Cadence, thus the content of the file
  can leak to other user contexts on the system. Luckily the data that is
  written there is not sensitive at the moment.

3) Affectedness and Patches

These two fixed tmp file paths have been around in Cadence since commits in
2012, all upstream version tags since version 0.9.0 contain them.

The attached patches are hotfixes based on version release 0.9.2 that I
authored to allow distributors to fix these issues until ways are found to
move away from Cadence.

4) Timeline

2023-08-04: I contacted the Cadence upstream author and reported the two
            vulnerabilities, offering coordinated disclosure.
            I quickly received a reply from the author stating that Cadence
            should no longer be used and that he intends to archive the
            project at some point.
2023-08-07: I replied that the tmp file issues aren't hard to fix and a
            maintenance-only release that also makes packagers aware of the
            need to move away from Cadence would be helpful.
2023-08-21: I received no more replies from the upstream author. Instead I
            found the GitHub repository archived in the meantime. Therefore I
            decided to provide custom patches for the openSUSE package.
2023-09-06: I requested CVE IDs from Mitre for the issues. I also published
            the information about the issues in our Bugzilla bug tracker.
2023-10-04: It took a longer time for Mitre to assign the CVE IDs. With all
            data available I published this report.

5) References


Best Regards


Matthias Gerstner <>
Security Engineer
GPG Key ID: 0x14C405C971923553
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
Geschäftsführer: Ivo Totev, Andrew McDonald, Werner Knoblich

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