Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 12:02:56 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security-team-members@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 430 v2 (CVE-2022-42335) - x86 shadow paging arbitrary pointer dereference -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2022-42335 / XSA-430 version 2 x86 shadow paging arbitrary pointer dereference UPDATES IN VERSION 2 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= In environments where host assisted address translation is necessary but Hardware Assisted Paging (HAP) is unavailable, Xen will run guests in so called shadow mode. Due to too lax a check in one of the hypervisor routines used for shadow page handling it is possible for a guest with a PCI device passed through to cause the hypervisor to access an arbitrary pointer partially under guest control. IMPACT ====== Guests running in shadow mode and having a PCI device passed through may be able to cause Denial of Service and other problems, escalation of privilege cannot be ruled out. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Only Xen version 4.17 is vulnerable. Only x86 systems are vulnerable. The vulnerability can be leveraged only by HVM guests running with shadow paging and having a PCI device passed through. MITIGATION ========== Not passing through PCI devices to HVM guests will avoid the vulnerability. Running HVM guests only in HAP (Hardware Assisted Paging) mode will also avoid the vulnerability. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Roger Pau Monné of XenServer. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the attached patch resolves this issue. Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most recent release tarball. Downstreams are encouraged to update to the tip of the stable branch before applying these patches. xsa430.patch xen-unstable - Xen 4.17.x $ sha256sum xsa430* c861cabdf546ec7583f2193f9c4f8a62579047315e5fe9eca3e9e944b67ca852 xsa430.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFABAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAmRHr/4MHHBncEB4ZW4u b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ6UsH/ib0ei76XtojIl9eaNCPoAotcGBXLDQScV133z5e 7UhW3JPUEG79+p22ACL52Km7wVtWwuL5QzbBDJaw47hTD1IwvoOTQ8Dx+KwyZGsK H8VW8WM70XyqxRJVfA+sEIEfRnxXKfWz6qWV5n2085XzFFwbF9c+ZZ6NafGv/Jd3 75eUwyGaR0o4YEnzKpLzqYFihK56YyJmZ0+rdYYydHKUy+oVcWjrNEh41Xa6lCJX OdZ60inTu8rizItE+xEsKLatvoKVrO9q/zhAtLm+iWldf8PTgY9tq4S89DRMD/BN uYIAL1xBCS2HC/IyUXI63PMwHg6fYzq+0JLjtYV0IYDfYE8= =tInZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "xsa430.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (2638 bytes)
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