Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 12:05:16 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security-team-members@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 411 v3 (CVE-2022-33748) - lock order inversion in transitive grant copy handling -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2022-33748 / XSA-411 version 3 lock order inversion in transitive grant copy handling UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= As part of XSA-226 a missing cleanup call was inserted on an error handling path. While doing so, locking requirements were not paid attention to. As a result two cooperating guests granting each other transitive grants can cause locks to be acquired nested within one another, but in respectively opposite order. With suitable timing between the involved grant copy operations this may result in the locking up of a CPU. IMPACT ====== Malicious or buggy guest kernels may be able to mount a Denial of Service (DoS) attack affecting the entire system. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Xen versions 4.0 and newer are vulnerable. Xen versions 3.4 and older are not vulnerable. Only guests with access to transitive grants can exploit the vulnerability. In particular, this means that: * ARM systems which have taken the XSA-268 fix are not vulnerable, as Grant Table v2 was disabled for other security reasons. * All systems with the XSA-226 fixes, and booted with `gnttab=max-ver:1` or `gnttab=no-transitive` are not vulnerable. * From Xen 4.16, the maximum grant table version can be controlled on a per-domain basis. For the xl toolstack, the vulnerability does not manifest if either: 1) Every guest has `max_grant_version=1` in their configuration file, or 2) The global xl.conf has `max_grant_version=1`, and no guests have the default overridden by selecting `max_grant_version=2`. Only multiple cooperating guests can exploit the vulnerability. MITIGATION ========== Disallowing the use of transitive grants either via the `gnttab=no-transitive` Xen command line option, or by disabling grant interface version 2 altogether via the `gnttab=max-ver:1` Xen command line option or the xl controls as mentioned above will avoid the vulnerability. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Jan Beulich of SUSE. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most recent release tarball. Downstreams are encouraged to update to the tip of the stable branch before applying these patches. xsa411.patch xen-unstable - Xen 4.15.x xsa411-4.14.patch Xen 4.14.x - 4.13.x $ sha256sum xsa411* 0802e2e4e9d03c82429a710bbb783cee2fded52d29b1d969b97c680d30c3ac57 xsa411.patch 8473f2ee34562298c5174f0a5b3c64c561a945333aab675845093ad23250d1cf xsa411-4.14.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. HOWEVER, deployment of the mitigations is NOT permitted (except where all the affected systems and VMs are administered and used only by organisations which are members of the Xen Project Security Issues Predisclosure List). Specifically, deployment on public cloud systems is NOT permitted. This is because it is a guest visible change which will draw attention to the issue. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFABAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAmNFTAAMHHBncEB4ZW4u b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZPsQH/1JCqscbx49QygGVEnq43C97HQpcoZcUNJGwGjBJ Li0SXejxd3iWsYsFlMAgmacHIjevEGv318JJLSM21hBULGe85cc6QatpWS0VWrBc tQVbDIgqNRv42gJCtf1dLF0TnlTZ6p3wiqfsxEYBn1zlEhe2ZEMpY8an4707O32d nQ90JFh44QJXx6HMZD3pEw2g1+4pMDu9yDUp/Yc3YmxYnXmPW6KE7iMmGkLLGigI GfiTI4FA/BDVIZkjPErwG7pyXmp2sdtVkv5o/cg7YTOrLzeBmegdyUvzuXkizJ2F PQnc1rgS/vXPkC62cy6fmLkeAf0dQhq6KBuxW3N8s2fXRXk= =/bRo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "xsa411.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (2204 bytes) Download attachment "xsa411-4.14.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (2226 bytes)
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