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Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2021 16:43:48 -0400 (EDT)
From: Stuart D Gathman <stuart@...hman.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...i.de>
Subject: Re: Trojan Source Attacks
> That's because unicode rendering is a UI element and calling compilers
> "impacted" is misunderstanding the issue. There's scope for adding
> new diagnostics to square with UI representation of unicode, but
> that's at best an optional warning and it may not even be feasible in
> all cases. A comprehensive language aware CI lint check is perhaps
> more suitable but if such a check devolves into "7-bit ascii only
> allowed" for all cases then we've regressed.
Bingo. For many current languages, unicode is supported in string
constants and comments only - so syntax coloring should highlight
anything beyond 7 or 8-bit outside of those elements.
Some support unicode variable/function names, and again syntax coloring
should be able to highlight sequences that cross word boundaries.
Having some sample source files to test your code editor/viewer on would be
helpful.
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