Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 13:44:43 +0100 From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@...rix.com> To: Xen.org security team <security@....org> CC: <xen-announce@...ts.xen.org>, <xen-devel@...ts.xen.org>, <xen-users@...ts.xen.org>, <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>, Xen.org security team <security-team-members@....org> Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 355 v2 - stack corruption from XSA-346 change On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 12:03:45PM +0000, Xen.org security team wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > Xen Security Advisory XSA-355 > version 2 > > stack corruption from XSA-346 change > > UPDATES IN VERSION 2 > ==================== > > Added metadata file. > > Public release. > > ISSUE DESCRIPTION > ================= > > One of the two changes for XSA-346 introduced an on-stack array. The > check for guarding against overrunning this array was off by one, > allowing for corruption of the first stack slot immediately following > this array. > > IMPACT > ====== > > A malicious or buggy HVM or PVH guest can cause Xen to crash, resulting > in a Denial of Service (DoS) to the entire host. Privilege escalation > as well as information leaks cannot be excluded. > > VULNERABLE SYSTEMS > ================== > > All Xen versions which have the patches for XSA-346 applied are > vulnerable. > > Only x86 HVM and PVH guests can leverage the vulnerability. Arm guests > and x86 PV guests cannot leverage the vulnerability. > > Only x86 HVM and PVH guests which have physical devices passed through > to them can leverage the vulnerability. There's no support for passthrough for x86 PVH guests yet, so this issue only affects x86 HVM with passthrough. Roger.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.