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Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 16:03:35 +0200
From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@...rb.eu>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Fwd: X.Org security advisory: July 31, 2020: libX11

----- Forwarded message from Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@...rb.eu> -----

Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 15:37:55 +0200
From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@...rb.eu>
To: xorg-announce@...ts.x.org
Cc: xorg-devel@...ts.x.org
Subject: X.Org security advisory: July 31, 2020: libX11

X.Org security advisory: July 31, 2020

Heap corruption in the X input method client in libX11
======================================================

CVE-2020-14344

The X Input Method (XIM) client implementation in libX11 has some
integer overflows and signed/unsigned comparison issues that can lead
to heap corruption when handling malformed messages from an input
method.

Patches
=======

Patches for these issues have been commited to the libX11 git repository.
libX11 1.6.10 will be released shortly and will include those patches.

https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11

commit 1703b9f3435079d3c6021e1ee2ec34fd4978103d (HEAD -> master)

    Change the data_len parameter of _XimAttributeToValue() to CARD16
    
    It's coming from a length in the protocol (unsigned) and passed
    to functions that expect unsigned int parameters (_XCopyToArg()
    and memcpy()).
    
commit 1a566c9e00e5f35c1f9e7f3d741a02e5170852b2

    Zero out buffers in functions
    
    It looks like uninitialized stack or heap memory can leak
    out via padding bytes.
    

commit 2fcfcc49f3b1be854bb9085993a01d17c62acf60

    Fix more unchecked lengths
    
commit 388b303c62aa35a245f1704211a023440ad2c488

    fix integer overflows in _XimAttributeToValue()
    

commit 0e6561efcfaa0ae7b5c74eac7e064b76d687544e

    Fix signed length values in _XimGetAttributeID()
    
    The lengths are unsigned according to the specification. Passing
    negative values can lead to data corruption.
    
Thanks
======

X.Org thanks Todd Carson for reporting these issues to our security
team and assisting them in understanding them and providing fixes.


-- 
Matthieu Herrb



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----- End forwarded message -----


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