Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 09:54:21 +0200 From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, "Xen.org security team" <security-team-members@....org> Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 329 v2 - Linux ioperm bitmap context switching issues Hello, Will a CVE be assigned to this flaw? Thanks, On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 3:21 PM Xen.org security team <security@....org> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > Xen Security Advisory XSA-329 > version 2 > > Linux ioperm bitmap context switching issues > > UPDATES IN VERSION 2 > ==================== > > Public release. > > ISSUE DESCRIPTION > ================= > > Linux 5.5 overhauled the internal state handling for the iopl() and > ioperm() > system calls. Unfortunately, one aspect on context switch wasn't wired up > correctly for the Xen PVOps case. > > IMPACT > ====== > > IO port permissions don't get rescinded when context switching to an > unprivileged task. Therefore, all userspace can use the IO ports granted > to > the most recently scheduled task with IO port permissions. > > VULNERABLE SYSTEMS > ================== > > Only x86 guests are vulnerable. > > All versions of Linux from 5.5 are potentially vulnerable. > > Linux is only vulnerable when running as x86 PV guest. Linux is not > vulnerable when running as an x86 HVM/PVH guests. > > The vulnerability can only be exploited in domains which have been granted > access to IO ports by Xen. This is typically only the hardware domain, and > guests configured with PCI Passthrough. > > MITIGATION > ========== > > Running only HVM/PVH guests avoids the vulnerability. > > CREDITS > ======= > > This issue was discovered by Andy Lutomirski. > > RESOLUTION > ========== > > Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. > > xsa329.patch Linux 5.5 and later > > $ sha256sum xsa329* > cdb5ac9bfd21192b5965e8ec0a1c4fcf12d0a94a962a8158cd27810e6aa362f0 > xsa329.patch > $ > > DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO > ========================= > > Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or > others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the > embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and > administrators. > > But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other > members of the predisclosure list). > > Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different > patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security > Team. > > > (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in > post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it > is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have > oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) > > For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, > consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: > http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > iQFABAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAl8QU6EMHHBncEB4ZW4u > b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ/sEIAMiCOnz119KTlRU50HTwa4pvIgLphf9htTbPzHXS > iEb8yINqMxmep8NRcAzwFREQP+Z4Tue1upt31Vx0RPkFZpUklLuuBSXsV0JA7+UM > LSGyWhkzDdnfj6iPUHycGmFzRTzkbB7qfcMj7khCvuYtSNbTUdOgUq04ngZksrSJ > UMhfgUNKXawULKvVe7572L/AQTmMXK8eaolb+eWtf1U2pFkZQR8GWoLmiFbKLks2 > X2tRUF4U4cHEBzxXRzYrD1ArWLajqK6hQmauwgkCCSowvCHoD1dTv55GlrlEo4od > MSB6YOVLl7HJuUw1GmwlKjA8XqStHq1Fi0urvlKCfHfK2Wk= > =MP+m > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -- Mauro Matteo Cascella, Red Hat Product Security 6F78 E20B 5935 928C F0A8 1A9D 4E55 23B8 BB34 10B0
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