Date: Tue, 07 Jul 2020 12:18:37 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security-team-members@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 319 v3 (CVE-2020-15563) - inverted code paths in x86 dirty VRAM tracking -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2020-15563 / XSA-319 version 3 inverted code paths in x86 dirty VRAM tracking UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= An inverted conditional in x86 HVM guests' dirty video RAM tracking code allows such guests to make Xen de-reference a pointer guaranteed to point at unmapped space. IMPACT ====== A malicious or buggy HVM guest may cause the hypervisor to crash, resulting in Denial of Service (DoS) affecting the entire host. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Xen versions from 4.8 onwards are affected. Xen versions 4.7 and earlier are not affected. Only x86 systems are affected. Arm systems are not affected. Only x86 HVM guests using shadow paging can leverage the vulnerability. In addition there needs to be an entity actively monitoring a guest's video frame buffer (typically for display purposes) in order for such a guest to be able to leverage the vulnerability. x86 PV guests as well as x86 HVM guest using hardware assisted paging (HAP) cannot leverage the vulnerability. MITIGATION ========== Running only PV guests will avoid the vulnerability. For HVM guest explicitly configured to use shadow paging (e.g. via the `hap=0' xl domain configuration file parameter), changing to HAP (e.g. by setting `hap=1') will avoid exposing the vulnerability to those guests. HAP is the default (in upstream Xen), where the hardware supports it; so this mitigation is only applicable if HAP has been disabled by configuration. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Jan Beulich of SUSE. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the attached patch resolves this issue. Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most recent release tarball. Downstreams are encouraged to update to the tip of the stable branch before applying these patches. xsa319.patch xen-unstable, 4.13 - 4.9 $ sha256sum xsa319* 1fe0dc2e274776b8e1275f85129280f280f94ca4eabe6a8166113283dad93ed8 xsa319.meta c145f394f8ac7d8838c376a97e1850c4125c12e478fc66ebe025ae397b27e6ea xsa319.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patch described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. HOWEVER deployment of the "use HAP mode" mitigation described above is NOT permitted (except where all the affected systems and VMs are administered and used only by organisations which are members of the Xen Project Security Issues Predisclosure List). Specifically, deployment on public cloud systems is NOT permitted. This is because in that case the configuration change can be observed by guests, which could lead to the rediscovery of the vulnerability. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFABAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAl8EZ/sMHHBncEB4ZW4u b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ75YH/jX/sAs0icOgBtHkwVZHg318OBExxt9x+ehk/pxb i+1ZlS/IrJ8eJdHJYq8HYvAlxmtmFP1I0t+C9vmwbP4QMcR++RmKgdJI4+/sqCsB AMEnK+cVJSbHxD7y7eW2CPuU3h0cKx0H24JgtzA2ONse7dVz7RN+oa97D5IKryTL cBW8WroMn2InbKMCUy/5zj89NLAlbSuWSVZzQidDwzTITukzhZZ7Xw0+Q2yh1nkK S4kcmz7Bzzd5Mc1gFr1Eh1FxfmVVl5RxwDE//3a5VbmfPVo/f0kMOIWjXVd1R1dj x78SPrPojOAZbb8+f1LYqHmqzCgzvpa4EFbsOnsB7CBmP2Q= =bDFh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "xsa319.meta" of type "application/octet-stream" (1675 bytes) Download attachment "xsa319.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (889 bytes)
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