Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 12:00:45 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security-team-members@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 314 v3 (CVE-2020-11739) - Missing memory barriers in read-write unlock paths -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2020-11739 / XSA-314 version 3 Missing memory barriers in read-write unlock paths UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= The read-write unlock paths don't contain a memory barrier. On Arm, this means a processor is allowed to re-order the memory access with the preceding ones. In other words, the unlock may be seen by another processor before all the memory accesses within the "critical" section. As a consequence, it may be possible to have a writer executing a critical section at the same time as readers or another writer. In other words, many of the assumptions (e.g a variable cannot be modified after a check) in the critical sections are not safe anymore. The read-write locks are used in hypercalls (such as grant-table ones), so a malicious guest could exploit the race. For instance, there is a small window where Xen can leak memory if XENMAPSPACE_grant_table is used concurrently. IMPACT ====== A malicous guest may be able to leak memory, or cause a hypervisor crash resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). Information leak and privilege escalation cannot be excluded. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Systems running all versions of Xen are affected. Whether an individual Arm-based CPU is vulnerable depends on its memory re-ordering properties. Consult your CPU vendor. x86 systems are not vulnerable. MITIGATION ========== There is no known mitigation. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Julien Grall of Amazon. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most recent release tarball. Downstreams are encouraged to update to the tip of the stable branch before applying these patches. xsa314.patch xen-unstable xsa314-4.13.patch Xen 4.13 - Xen 4.9 $ sha256sum xsa314* ff6e03780766d0358699ed0c5b0154be9ccbbc80796650f7568c295c5451ba0a xsa314.meta 7c507e7b46568e94aa9595a549bd3020b16d1eca97b8bfc3bb1f5d96eb338cc1 xsa314.patch a13e6a9cd531859882d1b0ef38245441d363d1ead1fa2a5ae5da7a0fce27e072 xsa314-4.13.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFABAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAl6VpdcMHHBncEB4ZW4u b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZNSoH/2TB+nP1KWB0LUkP5yD1tlSC6Q58k3ReUw7uVfLh OOBhyOZz5jQOO9r6HDQtqxZBtihbmCDD9Ckl3V4au81TFxz8My24nMR+X1dqDcPi 0MQ2+Tu3z6S/NMw9DwLsN9b0MtHlmalOBrhbhif3/U0QDgLFhN2H8GtvFQ1imWmm JHoTdBHDUwxCvThIHZCui/T69U/csdfyV6f/HgMVTzpNIOBkiwUuOVuMEO25KqVk tO0z0CyK19K86VJu7k4q16RzCllUoe5bSU+7UVYOS1PxZ5XCvKTCYcZDz1HZMW/8 FOA8yNMzHV3b+0WvCnMpq9qHmmJXGx+vRSoeBF7YeU0wUkE= =oA9H -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "xsa314.meta" of type "application/octet-stream" (1565 bytes) Download attachment "xsa314.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (3929 bytes) Download attachment "xsa314-4.13.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (4056 bytes)
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