Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 05:05:21 +0100 From: Noel Kuntze <noel.kuntze+oss-security@...rmi.consulting> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, "William J. Tolley" <william@...akpointingbad.com> Subject: Re: [CVE-2019-14899] Inferring and hijacking VPN-tunneled TCP connections. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello List, Some important comments on the matter and especially in regards to IPsec: * This attack works regardless of if you have a VPN or not. The attacker just needs to be able to send packets to the other host. It's not systemd specific. It can also occur because the user deliberately configured the rp_filter that way (that's sometimes the case if PBR (Policy Based Routing) is configured. The default for rp_filter is strict. For further information on the matter see ip-sysctl.txt and RFC 3704 Section 2.4. For now, just create a file /etc/sysctl.d/51-rpfilter.conf with the content "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=1". * You can solve the problem generally for IPv6 by using the rpfilter iptables or nftables module in *mangle PREROUTING. Just globally one rule is needed. * Only route based VPNs are impacted. In comparison, policy based VPNs are not impacted (On Linux only implementable using XFRM, which is IPsec on Linux specific) unless the XFRM policy's level is set to "use" instead of "required" (default)) because any traffic received that matches a policy (IPsec security policy) and that is not protected is dropped. An attacker could only inject packets by attacking the connection whenever it is unprotected (e.g. On a commercial VPN provider setup that would be when the connection "comes" out of the VPN server and goes to the destination on the WAN). So you're ususally fine. And even when a route based VPN is used, strict rp_filter can still save your bacon. The probing of "virtual" IPv4 addresses can be made more difficult by configuring the VPN software to bind them to, for example, the loopback interface and setting arp_ignore of any interface facing a possible attacker to 2. That would prevent the sending of arp responses to arp requests for virtual IPs. I am not aware of a similiar setting for IPv6. That might be related to the lack of an rp_filter setting for IPv6 on Linux. Probing for addresses by using any protocol other than TCP (because TCP on Linux is handled in a special way in regards to routing. It sends the responses over the same interface and MAC addresses as the request was received, AFAIR) would not be possible if the response was to go over the VPN tunnel because the VPN server would most likely drop it as a martian (the destination would probably be a private network and they're not routable over the Internet. It has to be investigated on a case by case basis). strongSwan by default binds any "virtual" IPs to the interface the route to the other peer goes over. You can change that though. I don't know about libreswan or openswan (shouldn't use the last one anyway). > This vulnerability works against OpenVPN, WireGuard, and IKEv2/IPSec, > but has not been thoroughly tested against tor, but we believe it is > not vulnerable since it operates in a SOCKS layer and includes > authentication and encryption that happens in userspace. It doesn't work against TOR because the destination address would be 127.0.0.1 and Linux (don't know about other operating systems) drops packets to that destination unless the input interface is loopback or route_localnet in sysctl of the input interface is set to 1 (used if services bound to localhost are exposed to the network via DNAT rules). > 3. Encrypted packet size and timing > > Since the size and number of packets allows the attacker to bypass the > encryption provided by the VPN service, perhaps some sort of padding > could be added to the encrypted packets to make them the same size. > Also, since the challenge ACK per process limit allows us to determine > if the encrypted packets are challenge ACKs, allowing the host to > respond with equivalent-sized packets after exhausting this limit could > prevent the attacker from making this inference. IPsec supports that. It's called TFC (Traffic Flow Confidentiality). It can be configured to arbitrary values or to pad up to the MTU of the link. It's disabled by default. Kind regards Noel  Would look like that: ip6tables -t mangle -I PREROUTING -m rpfilter --invert -j DROP  https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3704#section-2.4 Am 05.12.19 um 03:37 schrieb William J. Tolley: > Hi all, > > I am reporting a vulnerability that exists on most Linux distros, and > other *nix operating systems which allows a network adjacent attacker > to determine if another user is connected to a VPN, the virtual IP > address they have been assigned by the VPN server, and whether or not > there is an active connection to a given website. Additionally, we are > able to determine the exact seq and ack numbers by counting encrypted > packets and/or examining their size. This allows us to inject data into > the TCP stream and hijack connections. > > Most of the Linux distributions we tested were vulnerable, especially > Linux distributions that use a version of systemd pulled after November > 28th of last year which turned reverse path filtering off. However, we > recently discovered that the attack also works against IPv6, so turning > reverse path filtering on isn't a reasonable solution, but this was how > we discovered that the attack worked on Linux. > > Adding a prerouting rule to drop packets destined for the client's > virtual IP address is effective on some systems, but I have only tested > this on my machines (Manjaro 5.3.12-1, Ubuntu 19.10 5.3.0-23). This > rule was proposed by Jason Donenfeld, and an analagous rule on the > output chain was proposed by Ruoyu "Fish" Wang of ASU. We have some > concerns that inferences can still be made using slightly different > methods, but this suggestion does prevent this particular attack. > > There are other potential solutions being considered by the kernel > maintainers, but I can't speak to their current status. I will provide > updates as I receive them. > > I have attached the original disclosure I provided to > distros@...openwall.org and security@...nel.org below, with at least > one critical correction: I orignally listed CentOS as being vulnerable > to the attack, but this was incorrect, at least regarding IPv4. We > didn't know the attack worked against IPv6 at the time we tested > CentOS, and I haven't been able to test it yet. > > > William J. Tolley > Beau Kujath > Jedidiah R. Crandall > > Breakpointing Bad & > University of New Mexico > > > ************************************************* > > > **General Disclosure: > > We have discovered a vulnerability in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, MacOS, > iOS, and Android which allows a malicious access point, or an adjacent > user, to determine if a connected user is using a VPN, make positive > inferences about the websites they are visiting, and determine the > correct sequence and acknowledgement numbers in use, allowing the bad > actor to inject data into the TCP stream. This provides everything that > is needed for an attacker to hijack active connections inside the VPN > tunnel. > > This vulnerability works against OpenVPN, WireGuard, and IKEv2/IPSec, > but has not been thoroughly tested against tor, but we believe it is > not vulnerable since it operates in a SOCKS layer and includes > authentication and encryption that happens in userspace. It should be > noted, however, that the VPN technology used does not seem to matter > and we are able to make all of our inferences even though the responses > from the victim are encrypted, using the size of the packets and number > of packets sent (in the case of challenge ACKs, for example) to > determine what kind of packets are being sent through the encrypted VPN > tunnel. > > We have already reported a related vulnerability to Android earlier > this year related to the issue, which resulted in the assignment of > CVE-2019-9461, however, the CVE strictly applies to the fact that the > Android devices would respond to unsolicited packets sent to the user’s > virtual IP address over the wireless interface, but this does not > address the fundamental issue of the attack and did not result in a > change of the reverse path settings of Android as of the most recent > security update. > > This attack did not work against any Linux distribution we tested until > the release of Ubuntu 19.10, and we noticed that the rp_filter settings > were set to “loose” mode. We see that the default settings in > sysctl.d/50-default.conf in the systemd repository were changed from > “strict” to “loose” mode on November 28, 2018, so distributions using a > version of systemd without modified configurations after this date are > now vulnerable. Most Linux distributions we tested which use other init > systems leave the value as 0, the default for the Linux kernel. > > We have described the procedure for reproducing the vulnerability with > Linux and included a section illustrating the differences in > architecture. > > > > There are 3 steps to this attack: > > 1. Determining the VPN client’s virtual IP address > 2. Using the virtual IP address to make inferences about active > connections > 3. Using the encrypted replies to unsolicited packets to determine the > sequence and acknowledgment numbers of the active connection to hijack > the TCP session > > > > There are 4 components to the reproduction: > > 1. The Victim Device (connected to AP, 192.168.12.x, 10.8.0.8) > 2. AP (controlled by attacker, 192.168.12.1) > 3. VPN Server (not controlled by attacker, 10.8.0.1) > 4. A Web Server (not controlled by the attacker, public IP in a real- > world scenario) > > The victim device connects to the access point, which for most of our > testing was a laptop running create_ap. The victim device then > establishes a connection with their VPN provider. > > The access point can then determine the virtual IP of the victim by > sending SYN-ACK packets to the victim device across the entire virtual > IP space (the default for OpenVPN is 10.8.0.0/24). When a SYN-ACK is > sent to the correct virtual IP on the victim device, the device > responds with a RST; when the SYN-ACK is sent to the incorrect virtual > IP, nothing is received by the attacker. > > To quickly demonstrate this difference, we use the nping commands on > the AP device running create_ap. The source IP is the gateway of our > AP, the destination IP is the virtual IP assigned to the tun interface > by the VPN client, ap0 is the interface create_ap created on the > attacker device, and the destination MAC is the victim’s wireless MAC > address. > > For example: > > The correct address generates a RST from the victim: > > nping --tcp --flags SA --source-ip 192.168.12.1 --dest-ip 10.8.0.8 -- > rate 3 -c 3 -e ap0 --dest-mac 08:00:27:9c:53:12 > > The incorrect address does not elicit a response from the victim: > > nping --tcp --flags SA --source-ip 192.168.12.1 --dest-ip 10.8.0.9 -- > rate 3 -c 3 -e ap0 --dest-mac 08:00:27:9c:53:12 > > Similarly, to test if there is an active connection for any given > website, such as 18.104.22.168, for example, we send SYN or SYN-ACKs > from 22.214.171.124 on port 80 (or 443) to the virtual IP of the victim > across the entire ephemeral port space of the victim. The correct four- > tuple will elicit no more than 2 challenge ACKs per second from the > victim, whereas the victim will respond to the incorrect four-tuple > with a RST for each packet sent to it. > > To quickly test this, we suggest creating a netcat connection on the > victim device, such as this: > > Netcat 126.96.36.199 80 -p 40404 > > The correct four-tuple generates challenge ACKs > > nping --tcp --flags SA --source-ip 188.8.131.52 -g 80 --dest-ip > 10.8.0.8 -p 40404 --rate 10 -c 10 -e ap0 --dest-mac 08:00:27:9c:53:12 > > The incorrect four-tuple generates a single RST for each packet sent: > > nping --tcp --flags SA --source-ip 184.108.40.206 -g 80 --dest-ip > 10.8.0.8 -p 40405 --rate 10 -c 10 -e ap0 --dest-mac 08:00:27:9c:53:12 > > Finally, once the attacker determined that the user has an active TCP > connection to an external server, we will attempt to infer the exact > next sequence number and in-window acknowledgment number needed to > inject forged packets into the connection. To find the appropriate > sequence and ACK numbers, we will trigger responses from the client in > the encrypted connection found in part 2. The attacker will continually > spoof reset packets into the inferred connection until it sniffs > challenge ACKs. The attacker can reliably determine if the packets > flowing from the client to the VPN server are challenge ACKs by looking > at the size and timing of the encrypted responses in relation to the > attacker's spoofed packets. The victim’s device will trigger a TCP > challenge ACK on each reset it receives that has an in-window sequence > number for an existing connection. For example, if the client is using > OpenVPN to exchange encrypted packets with the VPN server, then the > client will always respond with an SSL packet of length 79 when a > challenge ACK is triggered. > > The attacker must spoof resets to different blocks across the entire > sequence number space until one triggers an encrypted challenge ACK. > The size of the spoof block plays a significant role in how long the > sequence inference takes, but should be conservative as to not skip > over the receive window of the client. In practice, when the attacker > thinks it sniffs an encrypted challenge-ACK, it can verify this is true > by spoofing X packets with the same sequence number. If there were X > encrypted responses with size 79 triggered, then the attacker knows for > certain it is triggering challenge ACKs (at most 2 packets of size 79 > per second). > > After the attacker has inferred the in-window sequence number for the > client's connection, they can quickly determine the exact sequence > number and in-window ACK needed to inject. First, they spoof empty > push-ACKs with the in-window sequence while guessing in-window ACK > numbers. Once the spoofed packets trigger another challenge-ACK, an in- > window ACK number is found. Finally, the attacker continually spoofs > empty TCP data packets with the in-window ACK and sequence numbers as > it decrements the sequence number after each send. The victim will > respond with another challenge ACK once the attacker spoofs the exact > sequence number minus one. The attacker can now inject arbitrary > payloads into the ongoing encrypted connection using the inferred ACK > and next sequence number. > > This can be tested by observing the behavior from this sequence of > commands, continuing with the same four-tuple: > > Using the four-tuple from the previous steps, we send RSTs in the > sequence number range in blocks of 50,000 until we trigger a challenge > ACK. > > nping --tcp --flags R --source-ip 220.127.116.11 -g 80 --dest-ip 10.8.0.8 > -p 40404 --rate 10 -c 10 -e ap0 --dest-mac 08:00:27:9c:53:12 --seq [SEQ > RANGE] > > If the packet lands in-window, the victim will respond with at most 2 > challenge ACKs per second. These packets are still encrypted and > originate from the virtual interface, unlike with Android, but we can > still determine the contents of these packets by their size. The > encrypted challenge ACK packets are larger than the encrypted RST > packets. You can run tcpdump on the victim machine to accelerate the > testing of his process by viewing the actual sequence and > acknowledgement numbers. > > After we have found an in-window sequence number, we locate an in- > window acknowledgement by spoofing empty PSH-ACKs with the in-window > sequence number and guessing the acknowledgement number by dividing the > acknowledgement number space into eight blocks. In most instances, > seven of these blocks will trigger challenge ACKs, but one of them will > not, which allows us to quickly determine which block falls within the > acknowledgement window. We are interested in the block that does not > respond with a challenge ACK. This behavior can be observed by using an > in-window sequence number and an acknowledgement number in the block > containing the correct acknowledgement number. > > nping --tcp --flags PA --source-ip 18.104.22.168 -g 80 --dest-ip > 10.8.0.8 -p 40404 --rate 10 -c 10 -e ap0 --dest-mac 08:00:27:9c:53:12 > -seq 12345678 --ack [ACK RANGE] > > Finally, using the in-window sequence and acknowledgement numbers, we > spoof empty PSH-ACKs using the same in-windows acknowledgement number > and decrementing the sequence number until we trigger another challenge > ACK. This sequence number is one fewer than the next expected sequence > number. We can then arbitrarily inject data into the active TCP > connection. > > Continuing with our toy example: > > nping --tcp --flags PA --source-ip 22.214.171.124 -g 80 --dest-ip > 10.8.0.8 -p 40404 --rate 10 -c 10 -e ap0 --dest-mac 08:00:27:9c:53:12 > -seq [EXACT] --ack [IN-WINDOW] --data-string “hello,world.” > > > > **Operating Systems Affected: > > Here is a list of the operating systems we have tested which are > vulnerable to this attack: > > Ubuntu 19.10 (systemd) > Fedora (systemd) > Debian 10.2 (systemd) > Arch 2019.05 (systemd) > Manjaro 18.1.1 (systemd) > > Devuan (sysV init) > MX Linux 19 (Mepis+antiX) > Void Linux (runit) > > Slackware 14.2 (rc.d) > Deepin (rc.d) > FreeBSD (rc.d) > OpenBSD (rc.d) > > This list isn’t exhaustive, and we are continuing to test other > distributions, but made usere to cover a variety of init systems to > show this is not limited to systemd. > > > > **Operating System Variations: > > The behavior is slightly different on other operating systems. Here is > a summary of the differences: > > Android: In the first phase of the attack, Android responds with > unencrypted RSTs to unsolicited SYN-ACKs for the correct port and ICMP > packets for the incorrect one. For the second phase, it will respond > with RSTs on the correct four-tuple. > > MacOS/iOS: The first phase of the attack does not work as described > here, but you can use an open port on the Apple machine to determine > the virtual IP address. We use port 5223, which is used for iCloud, > iMessage, FaceTime, Game Center, Photo Stream, and push notifications > etc. > > We know the phone will communicate with one of the push notification > servers on port 5223, and have observed that on MacOS, the port used on > the victim device is not the same as the port used to connect to the > VPN server, but is very close (in our testing it has always been within > 10). > > nping --tcp --flags SA --source-ip 17.57.144.[84-87] -g 5223 --dest-ip > 10.8.0.8 -p [X] --rate 3 -c 3 -e ap0 --dest-mac 08:00:27:9c:53:12 > > For iOS devices, it does not follow this convention for choosing the > client’s source port, but always choose a port between ~48000-50000 > (our testing on iOS 13.1 was between 48162-49555). > > FreeBSD: The first two phases work essentially the same as Linux, > however, for the last phase, the ACK number is not needed at all, so > that piece of phase three can be skipped. > > OpenBSD: OpenBSD responds to spoofed SYN packets to the correct virtual > IP with unencrypted RST packets, and the incorrect virtual IP elicits > unencrypted NTP packets or nothing at all for the first part of the > attack. For the second part, the responses are encrypted, but we can > still determine which packets are challenge ACKs from the packet size, > as with Linux. Connections can be reset by sending a RST with the > correct sequence number. > > > > **Possible Mitigations: > > 1. Turning reverse path filtering on > > Potential problem: Asynchronous routing not reliable on mobile devices, > etc. Also, it isn’t clear that this is actually a solution since it > appears to work in other OSes with different networking stacks. Also, > even with reverse path filtering on strict mode, the first two parts of > the attack can be completed, allowing the AP to make inferences about > active connections, and we believe it may be possible to carry out the > entire attack, but haven’t accomplished this yet. > > 2. Bogon filtering > > Potential problem: Local network addresses used for vpns and local > networks, and some nations, including Iran, use the reserved private IP > space as part of the public space. > > 3. Encrypted packet size and timing > > Since the size and number of packets allows the attacker to bypass the > encryption provided by the VPN service, perhaps some sort of padding > could be added to the encrypted packets to make them the same size. > Also, since the challenge ACK per process limit allows us to determine > if the encrypted packets are challenge ACKs, allowing the host to > respond with equivalent-sized packets after exhausting this limit could > prevent the attacker from making this inference. > > > We have prepared a paper for publication concerning this > vulnerability and the related implications, but intend to keep it > embargoed until we have found a satisfactory workaround. Then we will > report the vulnerability to oss-security@...ts.openwall.com. We are > also reporting this vulnerability to the other services affected, which > also includes: Systemd, Google, Apple, OpenVPN, and WireGuard, in > addition to distros@...openwall.org for the operating systems affected. > > Thanks, > > William J. Tolley > Beau Kujath > Jedidiah R. Crandall > > Breakpointing Bad & > University of New Mexico > - -- Noel Kuntze IT security consultant GPG Key ID: 0x0739AD6C Fingerprint: 3524 93BE B5F7 8E63 1372 AF2D F54E E40B 0739 AD6C -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEENSSTvrX3jmMTcq8t9U7kCwc5rWwFAl3oggAACgkQ9U7kCwc5 rWzHsQ//REvR9qw1gdlYOP1BM3kHjndht+zuRe+1NQwli4GZckvPS9FKRnQuH2LT RtMBaotrK750N4pvL//HCCuTLGGqV1R2DY2WOBbq3JY+BeSuhTiD2uMk/OhtqSW/ xYXTkWL9hEcIu6LNB0XPO2adLWFT7ujZcVgJ2B9aglPnymL2zdds0YxumSCR2kcV nWnpAxydmQ9hkdAlvAgfnPf+3cUGP3UF8eRTNjhphOu/QxT1JsvNJTnZxfhzHOhd YVcKUdL3LGs3+lgua74YzkIXbHqDY77U/XYZOnfLm++7U1pCySvDrj2mfO62/WcI NyXK1ufn/HLUlKKs6+fNyocSlPsQGsC/Pv9WBhhQpew/cXBjfcLKqozw/ozEpKTM vvtv2X5G1dsAelYS8rRekDU5BUvar8zizJeKJVRjuzVKdusqT4hAcEZKay1fj04P qwjzqTposBCcz32M7O4i8ySYwoWWUv+yRE9qiAGD8tH0HxB6/Ux7rYKQY7N4pVJF aD4jzj79XTR5CHQWYm8T+u1jGzD6GdlfDWpRziEcaxjRnkJ9S5clZD4UTBCUddcy SEuP6/CL7adTCRrpz9sN4E4x67yrZ5GnxHfRLLK60ptu2lkeQKmZpr32gx38FePu ElKYyWKaBlUlsquPiLGYh0q68EpaQSE/tsbVQS0GvHJ+mvEUPE4= =QV6l -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "0xF54EE40B0739AD6C.asc" of type "application/pgp-keys" (8489 bytes) Download attachment "0xF54EE40B0739AD6C.asc.sig" of type "application/octet-stream" (566 bytes)
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