Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2019 14:29:19 +0200
From: Cedric Buissart <>
Subject: ghostscript: CVE-2019-14811, CVE-2019-14812, CVE-2019-14813 and
 CVE-2019-14817 (.forceput exposed)


This is to report another 4 CVEs in ghostscript, rated important. They are all similar to the recently reported CVE-2019-10216 (reference to `.forceput` can be accessed)

Ghostscript is a suite of software providing an interpreter for Adobe Systems' PostScript (PS) and Portable Document Format (PDF) page description languages.  Its primary purpose includes displaying (rasterization & rendering) and printing of document pages, as well as conversions between different document formats.

1- CVE-2019-14811 : Safer Mode Bypass by .forceput Exposure in .pdf_hook_DSC_Creator (701445)

2- CVE-2019-14812 : Safer Mode Bypass by .forceput Exposure in setuserparams (701444)

3- CVE-2019-14813 : Safer Mode Bypass by .forceput Exposure in setsystemparams (701443)

4- CVE-2019-14817 : Safer Mode Bypass by .forceput Exposure in .pdfexectoken and other procedures (701450)

In each case, a specially crafted script could get a reference to .forceput and use that to disable the -dSAFER protection. This then allows the script to access file system outside of resitricted areas and execute arbitrary commands.
Regarding CVE-2019-14817, only the .pdfexectoken procedure was proven to be vulnerable, the other fixed methods were only potentially vulnerable.

Preventing the modification of the error handler might protect most of these vulnerable functions

The fixes have been pushed upstream :

CVE-2019-14811, CVE-2019-14812, CVE-2019-14813 :;a=commitdiff;h=885444fcbe10dc42787ecb76686c8ee4dd33bf33

CVE-2019-14817 :;a=commitdiff;h=cd1b1cacadac2479e291efe611979bdc1b3bdb19

Acknowledgments :
CVE-2019-14811, CVE-2019-14812, CVE-2019-14813 were reported to upstream by Hiroki MATSUKUMA of Cyber Defense Institute, Inc.

Noteworthy (similar to CVE-2019-10216) :
A recent modification, started in upstream commit 7ecbfda92b4c8dbf6f6c2bf8fc82020a29219eff, changed the access to file permissions. After this commit, the ability to modify the /PermitFile* entries from systemdict's /userparams entry should have no effect.
That is to say: getting a reference to highly privileged function (such as .forceput), can still be used to remove SAFER, and modify the /PermitFile* lists. However, the interpreter will still refuse to access files outside of a list provided from a set of command line options. This should mitigate the class of ghostscript vulnerabilities similar to the one described above.

Best regards

Cedric Buissart
Product Security
Red Hat

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.