Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 10:13:58 -0400 From: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@...uxfoundation.org Subject: linux-distros membership application - Microsoft > 1. Be an actively maintained Unix-like operating system distro with > substantial use of Open Source components Microsoft provides several distro-like builds which are not derivative of an existing distribution that are based on open source components: - Azure Sphere (https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/azure-sphere/): This Linux-based IoT device provides, among various things, security updates to deployed IoT devices. As the project is about to step out of public preview into the GA stage, we expect millions of these devices to be publicly used. - Windows Subsystem for Linux v2 (https://devblogs.microsoft.com/commandline/wsl-2-is-now-available-in-windows-insiders/): A Linux based distro that runs as a virtual machine on top of Windows hosts. WSL2 is currently available for public preview and scheduled for GA early 2020. - Products such as Azure HDInsight (https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/free/hdinsight) and the Azure Kubernetes Service (https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/kubernetes-service/) provide public access to a Linux based distribution. > 2. Have a userbase not limited to your own organization Microsoft customers have millions of cores running the various workloads described above. > 3. Have a publicly verifiable track record, dating back at least 1 > year and continuing to present day, of fixing security issues > (including some that had been handled on (linux-)distros, meaning that > membership would have been relevant to you) and releasing the fixes > within 10 days (and preferably much less than that) of the issues > being made public (if it takes you ages to fix an issue, your users > wouldn't substantially benefit from the additional time, often around > 7 days and sometimes up to 14 days, that list membership could give > you). Microsoft has decades long history of addressing security issues via MSRC (https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc). While we are able to quickly (<1-2 hours) create a build to address disclosed security issues, we require extensive testing and validation before we make these builds public. Being members of this mailing list would provide us the additional time we need for extensive testing. > 4. Not be (only) downstream or a rebuild of another distro (or else we > need convincing additional justification of how the list membership > would enable you to release fixes sooner, presumably not relying on > the upstream distro having released their fixes first?) None of our builds are based on an existing distribution. For few of these workloads we have a very custom kernel and userspace (such as for Azure Sphere), while some share a more conventional kernel/userspace configuration. > 5. Be a participant and preferably an active contributor in relevant > public communities (most notably, if you're not watching for issues > being made public on oss-security, which are a superset of those that > had been handled on (linux-)distros, then there's no valid reason for > you to be on (linux-)distros) We follow closely public discussions with regards to security issues that would affect us. While there was only a minor contribution back to these lists mostly as we did not have any value to add back. During past years I've reported multiple security issues which were assigned CVEs. > 6. Accept the list policy (see above) We accept the list's policy. > 7. Be able and willing to contribute back (see above), preferably in > specific ways announced in advance (so that you're responsible for a > specific area and so that we know what to expect from which member), > and demonstrate actual contributions once you've been a member for a > while We understand this need and will be contributing back. Looking at the list of vacant positions I can suggest the following, but I suspect that existing list members will have better suggestions. Technical: 3. Review and/or test the proposed patches and point out potential issues with them (such as incomplete fixes for the originally reported issues, additional issues you might notice, and newly introduced bugs), and inform the list of the work done even if no issues were encountered - primary: Amazon, backup: vacant Administrative: 3. Evaluate if the issue (or one of the issues) is effectively already public (e.g., a fix is committed upstream with a descriptive message) or/and is low severity and thus the report (or its portion pertaining to the issue) should be made public right away for one or both of these reasons, get a few other list members to confirm this understanding, and if there are no objections then communicate this strong preference to the reporter - primary: CloudLinux, backup: vacant > 8. Be able and willing to handle PGP-encrypted e-mail I am able and willing to handle PGP-encrypted e-mail. > 9. Have someone already on the private list, or at least someone else > who has been active on oss-security for years but is not affiliated > with your distro nor your organization, vouch for at least one of the > people requesting membership on behalf of your distro (then that one > vouched-for person will be able to vouch for others on your team, in > case you'd like multiple people subscribed) Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> would vouch for me (Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>). -- Thanks, Sasha
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