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Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 15:29:15 +0100
From: Jakub Wilk <jwilk@...lk.net>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: Travis CI MITM RCE
* Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@...thhorseman.net>, 2018-10-29, 08:52:
>>My proposed fix was to use "gpg --recv-key" with full fingerprint. But
>>I now discovered that even this is not resistant against MitM attacks:
>>
>>https://dev.gnupg.org/T3398
>>
>>"[...] modern gpg automatically applies an import screener that only
>>accepts OpenPGP certificates that have the given fingerprint [...]
>
>It may be even worse than this, because the version of gpg used by
>default in travis is not "modern gpg", it's either gnupg2
>2.0.22-3ubuntu1.4 or gnupg 1.4.16-1ubuntu2.6. I don't think either of
>these has the baseline "import screener" functionality
Ubuntu Precise and later releases have the import screener backported to
gnupg(2) packages:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/gnupg2/+bug/1409117
--
Jakub Wilk
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