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Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 15:57:22 -0400
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@...rmont.com>
To: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...gle.com>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: ghostscript: 1Policy operator gives access to
 .forceput CVE-2018-18284

On Tue, 16 Oct 2018 11:06:14 -0700 Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...gle.com>
wrote:
> Side note: I'm done looking at ghostscript for now, but still
> *strongly* recommend that we deprecate untrusted postscript and
> disable ghostscript coders by default in policy.xml.

Again, given that PostScript is an archival format for a lot of
documents, wouldn't a version of ghostscript with all the ability to
do anything dangerous removed from the interpreter at compile time be
rational?

(And yes, it wouldn't be "standard" but I don't know that I
care much about that, and it would mean it would be safe to look at
30 year old PS documents that are often the only way to look at
some old academic paper. I look at such things at least a couple of
times a month. If Artifex isn't willing to do this, it's open
source, someone else should.)

Perry
-- 
Perry E. Metzger		perry@...rmont.com

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