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Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2018 15:26:05 -0400
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <>
To: Tavis Ormandy <>
Cc:, Bob Friesenhahn
Subject: Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape
 -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961)

On Tue, 9 Oct 2018 15:32:02 -0700 Tavis Ormandy <>
> On Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 3:27 PM Perry E. Metzger
> <> wrote:
> > I keep wondering if there isn't a way to fully remove the
> > dangerous bits from a postscript interpreter so it can _only_ be
> > used to view the document and literally has no file system access
> > compiled in at all, so there's no way to touch the fs etc.
> > regardless of what flags the interpreter is invoked with.
> >
> > (I, too, find removing the ability to look at historical
> > postscript documents a bit more draconian than I like.)
> >
> >  
> I've discussed it with upstream, it's a hard no because they feel
> it would make ghostscript non-conforming (i.e. non-conforming with
> the Adobe PostScript Language Reference Manual)
> We probably have similar thoughts on this, but that is the final
> word from upstream.

They wouldn't even support a compilation mode where if you #define
the right thing those syscalls are cut out?

I don't care much about upstream's desires on this if they oppose
that. I'd be happy to have patches that simply cut out the dangerous
syscalls entirely. It's open source, that should be feasible.

Perry E. Metzger

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