Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2018 11:48:09 -0400 From: "David T." <davidmthomsen@...il.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Linux TCP implementation vulnerable to Denial of Service (CVE 2018-5390) Does anyone know if there as been an POC for this? Trying to figure out how critical this is. On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 11:38 Stiepan <stie@....swiss> wrote: > Hi, > > Thank you for fighting censorship on what is supposed to be a list for > managing security issues of open software. The issue is that it has gone so > far from its original idea, with the embargoes and removal of direct CVE > requests, that legal action remains the only logical one, for anyone not > part of the "club". As to getting some funding to run it properly, I > continue to do think it would make sense, if you can ensure independence > from a specific organization or government's interest (cc-ing Google, not > ITU or Protonmail, arbitrarily, says long on this very issue and the one of > Linux governance overall). > > Best, > Stiepan A. Kovac > President > itk AVtobvS SARL > > Envoyé depuis ProtonMail mobile > > -------- Message d'origine -------- > On 9 août 2018 à 14:51, Solar Designer a écrit : > > > Hi, > > > > A co-moderator had rejected Stiepan's message since it "does not provide > > any additional content to oss-security readers". I'm also unhappy about > > that, as well as about the focus on legal aspects in Stiepan's postings > > in here in general. However, the message raises an on-topic question > > (the request for more detail) and brings up an on-topic issue (the > > semi-embargo potentially causing harm). I feel strongly about us not > > getting into censorship, and I feel that rejecting this message would be > > it. So I went for the effort of manually restoring the already-rejected > > message into the moderation queue, then approved it. > > > > On Thu, Aug 09, 2018 at 07:12:27AM +0000, Stiepan wrote: > >> Could you please provide some more details on the issue? > > > > I agree that more detail must have been posted in here, especially given > > that such detail was on linux-distros. > > > > The issue is now also public via CERT: > > > > https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/962459 > > > > which links to: > > > > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net.git/commit/?id=1a4f14bab1868b443f0dd3c55b689a478f82e72e > > > > which includes the following detail: > > > > --- > > Juha-Matti Tilli reported that malicious peers could inject tiny > > packets in out_of_order_queue, forcing very expensive calls > > to tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() and tcp_prune_ofo_queue() for > > every incoming packet. > > > > With tcp_rmem default of 6MB, the ooo queue could > > contain ~7000 nodes. > > > > This patch series makes sure we cut cpu cycles enough to > > render the attack not critical. > > > > We might in the future go further, like disconnecting > > or black-holing proven malicious flows. > > --- > > > > The CERT Vulnerability Note also talks about a related issue in FreeBSD. > > > > Partial timeline for this issue as I became aware of it is as follows: > > > > 2018/07/23 - the commit referenced above > > 2018/07/23 - notification from CERT to some distros > > 2018/07/23 - grsecurity tweet linking to the commit > > 2018/07/27 - posting to linux-distros > > 2018/08/06 - CERT Vulnerability Note published > > 2018/08/08 - posting to oss-security > > > > Of course, I am unhappy about this semi-embargo, and even more unhappy > > about the semi-violation of linux-distros list policy on only having > > non-public issues in there. However, with CERT involved and with > > related issues affecting more than just Linux, there was little I could > > do, short of playing full BOFH and breaking the semi-embargo for > > everyone. While I think that would have been for the general public's > > benefit overall, I didn't feel about it strongly enough to actually do > > it this time. I apologize for letting this happen. (At the same time, > > I did force another semi-public issue to oss-security right away since > > that one didn't involve coordination with so many parties.) > > > > It appears that everyone involved, including the CERT people, Matthew, > > and others commenting on the linux-distros thread, were unhappy about > > the publication delay. No one I saw said that they wanted the delay. > > Yet somehow CERT didn't pull the trigger sooner. I guess two weeks > > feels very soon for CERT as it is, even if it is a very long embargo for > > linux-distros. Also, I guess the discoverer/reporter of the issue had a > > say on it behind the scenes, and other related issues and non-Linux were > > considered in CERT's decision-making. > > > > I am also unhappy about the two-day delay between publication of the > > CERT Vulnerability Note and the mandatory posting to oss-security (it's > > mandatory since the issue was on linux-distros). I've been pinging > > off-list to make this happen at all, and would have probably made the > > posting myself if it didn't happen for another day. > > > >> About the same period, our secure e-mail provider suffered an > unprecedented DDoS with some e-mail messages never reaching us. > >> Since this has business impact, > > > > This is almost certainly unrelated. (And I dropped the CC's to > > ProtonMail and ITU on this reply, not to spam them with further > > discussion of the unrelated issue.) > > > >> we consider legal action against the opaque Linux-distros > vulnerability-disclosure-among-friends-for-fun-and-profit scheme, that we > exposed at the ITU earlier this year. This is digital divide in the works, > with real impact for non-club-members. > > > > Personally, I strongly oppose legal threats (let alone action) in our > > community. The way I see it, what we have is primarily a matter of > > different opinions on how to handle security issues best, and most > > people are genuinely acting the way they think works best for everyone > > affected. With many parties involved in coordinating a disclosure, it > > usually becomes difficult. There isn't necessarily a right or wrong > > here. But whoever brings legal action is definitely wrong. > > > > Ironically, Stiepan had also suggested (here on oss-security a while > > ago) that we apply for funding for running the (linux-)distros list (and > > I explained in a reply why we shouldn't). > > > > Alexander -- Very respectfully, David M Thomsen
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