Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 19:17:03 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security-team-members@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 254 (CVE-2017-5753,CVE-2017-5715,CVE-2017-5754) - Information leak via side effects of speculative execution -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2017-5753,CVE-2017-5715,CVE-2017-5754 / XSA-254 version 11 Information leak via side effects of speculative execution UPDATES IN VERSION 11 ===================== Information provided about migitation for Spectre variant 2. Mention whether CPU hardware virtualisation extensions are required in the SP3 mitigations summary table. An additional patch "x86: fix GET_STACK_END" is required to fix a possible build failure in the PTI patches. README.pti updated accordingly. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= Processors give the illusion of a sequence of instructions executed one-by-one. However, in order to most efficiently use cpu resources, modern superscalar processors actually begin executing many instructions in parallel. In cases where instructions depend on the result of previous instructions or checks which have not yet completed, execution happens based on guesses about what the outcome will be. If the guess is correct, execution has been sped up. If the guess is incorrect, partially-executed instructions are cancelled and architectural state changes (to registers, memory, and so on) reverted; but the whole process is no slower than if no guess had been made at all. This is sometimes called "speculative execution". Unfortunately, although architectural state is rolled back, there are other side effects, such as changes to TLB or cache state, which are not rolled back. These side effects can subsequently be detected by an attacker to determine information about what happened during the speculative execution phase. If an attacker can cause speculative execution to access sensitive memory areas, they may be able to infer what that sensitive memory contained. Furthermore, these guesses can often be 'poisoned', such that attacker can cause logic to reliably 'guess' the way the attacker chooses. This advisory discusses three ways to cause speculative execution to access sensitive memory areas (named here according to the discoverer's naming scheme): "Bounds-check bypass" (aka SP1, "Variant 1", Spectre CVE-2017-5753): Poison the branch predictor, such that victim code is speculatively executed past boundary and security checks. This would allow an attacker to, for instance, cause speculative code in the normal hypercall / emulation path to execute with wild array indexes. "Branch Target Injection" (aka SP2, "Variant 2", Spectre CVE-2017-5715): Poison the branch predictor. Well-abstracted code often involves calling function pointers via indirect branches; reading these function pointers may involve a (slow) memory access, so the CPU attempts to guess where indirect branches will lead. Poisoning this enables an attacker to speculatively branch to any code that is executable by the victim (eg, anywhere in the hypervisor). "Rogue Data Load" (aka SP3, "Variant 3", Meltdown, CVE-2017-5754): On some processors, certain pagetable permission checks only happen when the instruction is retired; effectively meaning that speculative execution is not subject to pagetable permission checks. On such processors, an attacker can speculatively execute arbitrary code in userspace with, effectively, the highest privilege level. More information is available here: https://meltdownattack.com/ https://spectreattack.com/ https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html Additional Xen-specific background: Xen hypervisors on most systems map all of physical RAM, so code speculatively executed in a hypervisor context can read all of system RAM. When running PV guests, the guest and the hypervisor share the address space; guest kernels run in a lower privilege level, and Xen runs in the highest privilege level. (x86 HVM and PVH guests, and ARM guests, run in a separate address space to the hypervisor.) However, only 64-bit PV guests can generate addresses large enough to point to hypervisor memory. IMPACT ====== Xen guests may be able to infer the contents of arbitrary host memory, including memory assigned to other guests. An attacker's choice of code to speculatively execute (and thus the ease of extracting useful information) goes up with the numbers. For SP1, an attacker is limited to windows of code after bound checks of user-supplied indexes. For SP2, the attacker will in many cases will be limited to executing arbitrary pre-existing code inside of Xen. For SP3 (and other cases for SP2), an attacker can write arbitrary code to speculatively execute. Additionally, in general, attacks within a guest (from guest user to guest kernel) will be the same as on real hardware. Consult your operating system provider for more information. NOTE ON TIMING ============== This vulnerability was originally scheduled to be made public on 9 January. It was accelerated at the request of the discloser due to one of the issues being made public. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Systems running all versions of Xen are affected. For SP1 and SP2, both Intel and AMD are vulnerable. Vulnerability of ARM processors to SP1 and SP2 varies by model and manufacturer. ARM has information on affected models on the following website: https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update For SP3, only Intel processors are vulnerable. (The hypervisor cannot be attacked using SP3 on any ARM processors, even those that are listed as affected by SP3.) Furthermore, only 64-bit PV guests can exploit SP3 against Xen. PVH, HVM, and 32-bit PV guests cannot exploit SP3. MITIGATION ========== There is no mitigation for SP1. SP2 can be mitigated by a combination of new microcode and compiler and hypervisor changes. See Resolution below. SP3 can be mitigated by page-table isolation ("PTI"). See Resolution below. SP3 can, alternatively, be mitigated by running guests in HVM or PVH mode. (Within-guest attacks are still possible unless the guest OS has also been updated with an SP3 mitigation series such as KPTI/Kaiser.) For guests with legacy PV kernels which cannot be run in HVM or PVH mode directly, we have developed two "shim" hypervisors that allow PV guests to run in HVM mode or PVH mode. This prevents attacks on the host, but it leaves the guest vulnerable to Meltdown attacks by its own unprivileged processes, even if the guest OS has KPTI or similar Meltdown mitigation. The HVM shim (codenamed "Vixen") is available now, as is the PVH shim (codenamed "Comet") for Xen 4.10 and Xen 4.8. Please read README.which-shim to determine which shim is suitable for you. RESOLUTION ========== These are hardware bugs, so technically speaking they cannot be properly fixed in software. However, it is possible in many cases to provide patches to software to work around the problems. There is no available resolution for SP1. A solution may be available in the future. SP2 can be mitigated on x86 by combinations of new CPU microcode and new hypervisor code. The required hypervisor changes for Xen 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 are detailed in the attached README.bti. For AMD hardware, and for Intel hardware pre-dating the Skylake microarchitecture, the hypervisor changes alone are sufficient to mitigate the issue for Xen itself. No microcode updates are required. For the Intel Skylake microarchitecture the hypervisor changes are insufficient to protect Xen without appropriate new microcode. Microcode updates are required in any event to guard against one guest attacking another. Consult Intel, your hardware vendor, or your dom0 OS distributor for the microcode updates. Additionally, compiler support for `indirect thunk' is required. Again, without appropriate compiler support, the hypervisor patches are insufficient. Consult your compiler distributor. SP2 is mitigated on ARM 32-bit by a set of changes to the hypervisor alone. SP2 can be mitigated on ARM 64-bit (aarch64) by a combination of new PSCI firmware and new hypervisor code. The required hypervisor changes for Xen 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 are detailed in the attached README.bti. For ARM 32-bit these changes are complete. For ARM 64-bit the hypervisor changes are still in development and are expected to be available soon. SP3 can be mitigated by page-table isolation ("PTI"). We have a "stage 1" implementation. It allows 64-bit PV guests to be run natively while restricting what can be accessed via SP3 to the Xen stack of the current pcpu (which may contain remnants of information from other guests, but should be much more difficult to attack reliably). Unfortunately these "stage 1" patches incur a non-negligible performance overhead; about equivalent to the "PV shim" approaches above. Moving to plain HVM or PVH guests is recommended where possible. For more information on that, see below. Patches for the "stage-1" PTI implementation are available in the Xen staging-NN branches for each Xen revision. See README.pti for specific revisons. SP3 MITIGATION OPTIONS SUMMARY TABLE FOR 64-bit X86 PV GUESTS ============================================================= Everything in this section applies to 64-bit PV x86 guests only. Xen PTI Use PVH Use HVM PVH shim HVM shim "stage 1" "Comet" "Vixen" How to use README.pti type="pvh" type="hvm" README.comet README.vixen Guest All Linux 4.11+ Most All All support ?unikernels? Xen 4.6+ 4.10+ All 4.10, 4.8 All versions 4.8-comet Testing Limited 4.10: Good Very good Moderate Very good status Very new 4.8: Moderate Performance Fair Excellent Varies Fair Fair Hypervisor Needed No need No need No need No need changes SP3 guest Substantially Protected Protected Protected Protected to host protected SP3 within Protected Guest Guest Vulnerable Vulnerable guest patches patches   SP3 from Protected n/a; vuln. n/a; vuln. n/a; vuln. n/a; vuln. dom0 user     Device model No dm No dm Qemu No dm Qemu Config change None type="pvh" type="hvm"/ type="pvh" Tool to rewrite builder="hvm" pvshim=1 Needs "sidecar" Within-guest None Should be Disks+net None None changes? none may change CPU hw virt Not needed Needed Needed Needed Needed feature (VT-x) Extra RAM use V. slight None ~9Mb/guest >=~20Mb/guest >=~29Mb/guest Migration OK OK OK OK Unsupported Guest mem adj OK OK OK Broken Unsupported vcpu hotplug OK OK OK OK Unsupported Solution Indefinite Indefinite Indefinite Indefinite Limited lifetime    PVH is supported in Xen 4.8 only with the 4.8 "Comet" security release branch.  Some features in PVH/HVM shim guests are not inherently broken, but buggy in the currently available versions. These may be fixed in future proper releases of the same feature.  Most unikernels have Xen support based on a version of mini-os. mini-os master can boot PVH. But this is very recent.  Some guests which have support for Xen PV fail to boot properly in Xen HVM. Some such guests can made to boot HVM by disabling the PV-on-HVM support entirely in the guest or in Xen; in that case the guest may work but IO performance will be poor. Some PV-supporting guests can boot as HVM, with PV drivers, but fail when migrated.  The Comet and Vixen shim hypervisors direct-map all of their "physical" memory, and that direct-map can be accessed using Meltdown by unprivileged processes in the guest. So the guest is vulnerable to within-guest Meltdown attacks and the guest operating system cannot protect itself.  "Vixen" HVM shim is not expected to be incorporated in future Xen stable releases. At some point, support for it will be withdrawn. However, HVM shim functionality may be available in a future Xen 4.10 stable point release and would then probably be useable with the existing conversion script provided in this advisory.  The lifetime of the special Comet branches is limited, but we will not desupport them until some time after the same functionality is in appropriate Xen stable point releases.  The 64-bit x86 PV guest ABI precludes a guest from mapping its kernel and userspace in the same address space. So these guests are inherently immune to within-guest Meltdown attacks, without within-guest patching. (This applies to 64-bit x86 PV guests only.)  It is not possible to run dom0 as HVM. dom0 PVH is a planned enhancement which is not yet available even in preview form. ATTACHMENTS =========== $ sha256sum xsa254*/* c5f2d8f87169edc9be890416a4d261cfc11d9f8d898d83a8922360b210676015 xsa254/README.bti 1cba14ff83844d001d6c8a74afc3f764f49182cc7a06bb4463548450ac96cc2f xsa254/README.comet 208453583ee3c7bb427aa2f70fc5fdc687ba084341129624e511eb6c064fb801 xsa254/README.pti 3ef42381879befc84aa78b67d3a9b7b0cd862a2ffa445810466e90be6c6a5e86 xsa254/README.vixen 7e816160c1c1d1cd93ec3c3dd9753c8f3957fefe86b7aa967e9e77833828f849 xsa254/README.which-shim 1d2098ad3890a5be49444560406f8f271c716e9f80e7dfe11ff5c818277f33f8 xsa254/pvshim-converter.pl $ NOTE ON LACK OF EMBARGO ======================= The timetable and process were set by the discloser. After the intensive initial response period for these vulnerabilities is over, we will prepare and publish a full timeline, as we have done in a handful of other cases of significant public interest where we saw opportunities for process improvement. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJakGiYAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZTo0H/jmtssoZhVRYDbi5UP07eWla ZefMHnwagNUeMEf4rZgWoGSuftiRPMXH73V4r02SDfIauC/7qTPJTxg3ozBLP6RK d3bQtdb+Hr/i5mtYnD/ubjmg+VgB04Q4CF5Ikgc8Yx8qiUuSxo5HTHQV72a175eZ ze6xRBvUSt4hw25X7kNGYpkpN1Hoyydv2/pHPdkuAfP90ZTlxPq+UWDwa37Z55ON E/hVjBcvsnpvmgfztablVz5kFA+6O1aXzFuouNCQz0x62necQCrRgz9T173dlB1+ uQlvNN8gXV513ePaYjVP3B7c7P3QjMszX4WlK498KZTwo4ck+h0XtYdLtPAAZrg= =2SNf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "xsa254/README.bti" of type "application/octet-stream" (22223 bytes) Download attachment "xsa254/README.comet" of type "application/octet-stream" (2896 bytes) Download attachment "xsa254/README.pti" of type "application/octet-stream" (2536 bytes) Download attachment "xsa254/README.vixen" of type "application/octet-stream" (2738 bytes) Download attachment "xsa254/README.which-shim" of type "application/octet-stream" (4010 bytes) Download attachment "xsa254/pvshim-converter.pl" of type "application/octet-stream" (6762 bytes)
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