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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 14:35:59 +0100
From: Jakub Wilk <>
Subject: Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files

There's another problem with vim swapfiles.

If you edit a file directly in /tmp, vim will happily read a swapfile 
that were planted there by somebody else. Local users could exploit this 
for denial of service (or maybe worse if there are any swapfile parsing 

Is that a bug in vim? Or is it a user error to edit file directly in 

In the latter case, we should fix at least vipe(1) and vidir(1) from 
moreutils; and run-mailcap(1).

Jakub Wilk

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