Date: Tue, 30 May 2017 15:02:49 -0500 From: Sergio Pena <sergio.pena@...udera.com> To: dev <dev@...e.apache.org> Cc: "security@...e.apache.org" <security@...e.apache.org>, "bcrawford@...tco.com" <bcrawford@...tco.com>, "announce@...che.org" <announce@...che.org>, "bugtraq@...urityfocus.com" <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>, "oss-security@...ts.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>, "user@...e.apache.org" <user@...e.apache.org> Subject: Re: CVE-2016-3083: Apache Hive SSL vulnerability bug disclosure Hi Vaibhav, Do you happen to know which JIRA or patches addressed this issue? - Sergio On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 5:56 PM, Vaibhav Gumashta <vgumashta@...tonworks.com > wrote: > Severity: Important > > Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation > > Versions Affected: > Apache Hive 0.13.x > Apache Hive 0.14.x > Apache Hive 1.0.0 - 1.0.1 > Apache Hive 1.1.0 - 1.1.1 > Apache Hive 1.2.0 - 1.2.1 > Apache Hive 2.0.0 > > Description: > > Apache Hive (JDBC + HiveServer2) implements SSL for plain TCP and HTTP > connections (it supports both transport modes). While validating the > server's certificate during the connection setup, the client doesn't seem > to be verifying the common name attribute of the certificate. In this way, > if a JDBC client sends an SSL request to server abc.com, and the server > responds with a valid certificate (certified by CA) but issued to xyz.com, > the client will accept that as a valid certificate and the SSL handshake > will go through. > > Mitigation: > > Upgrade to Apache Hive 1.2.2 for 1.x release line, or to Apache Hive 2.0.1 > or later for 2.0.x release line, or to Apache Hive 2.1.0 and later for > 2.1.x release line. > > Credit: This issue was discovered by Branden Crawford from Inteco Systems > Limited (inetco.com). >
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.